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Preface
Hypothetical reasoning or reasoning under assumptions is a key concept of logic,
philosophy of science and mathematics. The Conference on Hypothetical Reasoning
focussed on its logical aspects, such as
– assumption-based calculi and their proof theory,
– logical consequence from a proof-theoretic or model-theoretic point of view,
– logics of conditionals,
– proof systems,
– structure of assumption-based proofs,
– hypotheses in proof-theoretic semantics,
– notions of implication,
– substructural logics,
– hypotheses in categorial logic,
– logical aspects of scientific explanation,
– hypothetical reasoning in mathematics,
– reasoning from definitions and axioms.
The conference took place 23–24 August, 2014 in Tu¨bingen at the Department of
Philosophy, in conjunction with ESSLLI 2014. The proceedings collect abstracts, slides
and papers of the presentations given.
The conference and its proceedings were supported by the French-German ANR-
DFG project “Hypothetical Reasoning: Its Proof-Theoretic Analysis” (HYPOTHE-
SES), DFG grant Schr 275/16-2.
Thomas Piecha
Peter Schroeder-Heister
v
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9.15–10.15 Francesca Poggiolesi: Counterfactual logics: natural deduction calculi and
sequent calculi
10.15–10.45 Coffee break
10.45–11.15 Sergey Melikhov: A joint logic of problems and propositions, a modified
BHK-interpretation and proof-relevant topological models of intuitionistic
logic
11.15–11.45 Torben Brau¨ner: Seligman-style deduction for hybrid modal logic
11.45–12.15 Grigory Olkhovikov:Truth-value gaps and paradoxes ofmaterial implication
12.15–14.15 Lunch break (Wirtshaus Lichtenstein)
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15.15–15.45 Coffee break
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Arnon Avron
School of Computer Science Department
Tel Aviv University
Using Assumptions in Gentzen-type Systems
Conference on Hypothetical Reasoning, August 2014
 What is a Propositional Logic?
This is a pair 〈L,`〉, where L is a propositional language, and ` is a
relation between sets of formulas of L and formulas of L that satisfies:
Reflexivity: if ϕ ∈ T then T ` ϕ.
Monotonicity: if T ` ϕ and T ⊆ T ′ then T ′ ` ϕ.
Transitivity: if T ` ψ and T, ψ ` ϕ then T ` ϕ.
Structurality: T ` ϕ then σ(T ) ` σ(ϕ)
Consistency p 6` q
1
 Gentzen-style Proof Systems
• Hilbert-style systems operate on L-formulas. Gentzen-style
systems operate on sequents.
• A sequent: an expression of the form Γ⇒ ∆, where Γ,∆ are
finite sets of L-formulas.
• A standard Gentzen-type system for L consists of:
1. Standard axioms: ψ ⇒ ψ.
2. Structural Weakening and Cut rules:
Γ⇒ ∆
Γ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆,∆′ (Weakening)
Γ, ψ ⇒ ∆ Γ⇒ ∆, ψ
Γ⇒ ∆ (Cut)
3. Logical introduction rules for the connectives of L.
 The Associated Consequence Relations
• Let Θ be a set of sequents, and Γ⇒ ∆ a sequent.
Θ `G Γ⇒ ∆ if there is a finite list of sequents whose last
sequent is Γ⇒ ∆, and each sequent in this list is either an
axiom of G, or a member of Θ, or is obtained from previous
sequents in the sequence by applying some rule of G.
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 The Associated Consequence Relations
• Let Θ be a set of sequents, and Γ⇒ ∆ a sequent.
Θ `G Γ⇒ ∆ if there is a finite list of sequents whose last
sequent is Γ⇒ ∆, and each sequent in this list is either an
axiom of G, or a member of Θ, or is obtained from previous
sequents in the sequence by applying some rule of G.
• T `tG ψ if there is some finite Γ ⊆ T, such that Γ⇒ ψ is
provable in G.
• T `vG ψ if there is some finite Γ ⊆ T, such that
{⇒ ϕ | ϕ ∈ Γ} `G⇒ ψ.
 An Example: Modal Logics
In all Gentzen-type systems for the important modal logics:
√ ⇒ ψ⇒ ψ X ψ ⇒ ψy y
ψ `v ψ ψ 6`t ψ
Hence in all of them:
`v 6= `t
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 Sources and Processor: Belnap’s Model
• A processor collects and processes information from a set of
sources. Each source may provide the processor with
information about atomic formulas. The information has the
form of a truth-value in {1, 0, I}.
• The processor assigns to an atom p a subset d(p) of {0, 1}:
– 1 ∈ d(p) iff some source has assigned 1 to p
– 0 ∈ d(p) iff some source has assigned 0 to p
t = {1} - told to be true but not told to be false
f = {0} - told to be false but not told to be true
> = {0, 1} - told to be true and told to be false
⊥ = ∅ - not told to be true and not told to be false
 Belnap’s Model (Continued)
Let F = F{¬,∨,∧}.
The processor’s valuation is extended to F as follows:
(db1) 0 ∈ d(¬ϕ) iff 1 ∈ d(ϕ);
(db2) 1 ∈ d(¬ϕ) iff 0 ∈ d(ϕ);
(db3) 1 ∈ d(ϕ ∨ ψ) iff 1 ∈ d(ϕ) or 1 ∈ d(ψ);
(db4) 0 ∈ d(ϕ ∨ ψ) iff 0 ∈ d(ϕ) and 0 ∈ d(ψ)
(db5) 1 ∈ d(ϕ ∧ ψ) iff 1 ∈ d(ϕ) and 1 ∈ d(ψ);
(db6) 0 ∈ d(ϕ ∧ ψ) iff 0 ∈ d(ϕ) or 0 ∈ d(ψ).
4
 The Basic Bilattice FOUR
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 More General Model
• A source may provide information about any formula.
• The processor valuation d is the minimal function from F to
P({0, 1}) which satisfies:
(d0) For x ∈ {0, 1}, x ∈ d(ϕ) if s(ϕ) = x for some source s.
(d1) 0 ∈ d(¬ϕ) iff 1 ∈ d(ϕ);
(d2) 1 ∈ d(¬ϕ) iff 0 ∈ d(ϕ);
(d3) 1 ∈ d(ϕ ∨ ψ) if 1 ∈ d(ϕ) or 1 ∈ d(ψ);
(d4) 0 ∈ d(ϕ ∨ ψ) iff 0 ∈ d(ϕ) and 0 ∈ d(ψ);
(d5) 1 ∈ d(ϕ ∧ ψ) iff 1 ∈ d(ϕ) and 1 ∈ d(ψ);
(d6) 0 ∈ d(ϕ ∧ ψ) if 0 ∈ d(ϕ) or 0 ∈ d(ψ).
5
 Non-deterministic Matrices
A non-deterministic matrix (Nmatrix) for L is a tupleM = 〈V,D,O〉:
• V - the set of truth-values,
• D - the set of designated truth-values,
• O - contains an interpretation function ˜ : Vn → P+(V) for
every n-ary connective  of L.
A (legal) valuation in an NmatrixM = 〈V,D,O〉 is any function
v : FL → V which satisfies:
v((ψ1, ..., ψn)) ∈ ˜(v(ψ1), ..., v(ψn))
In ordinary matrices: each ˜ returns only singletons.
 Logics Induced by Nmatrices
• A valuation v in an NmatrixM is a model of:
– a formula ψ (v |=M ψ) if v(ψ) ∈ D.
– a theory T ⊆ FL (v |=M T ) if v |=M ψ for all ψ ∈ T .
• The formula consequence relation induced byM is the relation
`M on P(FL)×FL such that T `M ϕ if every model of T inM
is also a model of ϕ.
THEOREM: For any finite NmatrixM for L, LM = 〈L,`M〉 is a
decidable and finitary propositional logic.
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 Characterization of a Reasonable Processor
A function d : F → {f,⊥,>, t} is an ESP processor valuation iff it is
anM4I -valuation, whereM4I = 〈V,D,O〉 is the Nmatrix:
V = {f,⊥,>, t},D = {>, t},O = {¬˜, ∨˜, ∧˜}
where the interpretations of the connectives are given by:
¬˜
f {t}
⊥ {⊥}
> {>}
t {f}
∨˜ f ⊥ > t
f {f,>} {t,⊥} {>} {t}
⊥ {t,⊥} {t,⊥} {t} {t}
> {>} {t} {>} {t}
t {t} {t} {t} {t}
∧˜ f ⊥ > t
f {f} {f} {f} {f}
⊥ {f} {f,⊥} {f} {f,⊥}
> {f} {f} {>} {>}
t {f} {f,⊥} {>} {t,>}
 The Need for Sequents
The expressive power of the formulas in {¬,∨,∧} is too weak:
• We cannot fully express negative information (e.g., that
1 6∈ d(ϕ)).
• We cannot fully express disjunctive information (e.g., that
either 1 ∈ d(ϕ) or 1 ∈ d(ψ)).
• The language provides no implication connective
corresponding to the intended consequence relation.
To compensate for this, we reasons with sequents. Given an ESP
structure 〈S, d〉, a sequent ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⇒ ψ1, . . . , ψk expresses the
information that either 1 6∈ d(ϕ1), or 1 6∈ d(ϕ2), or . . . or 1 6∈ d(ϕn),
or 1 ∈ d(ψ1), or . . . or 1 ∈ d(ψk).
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 Sequents and (N)matrices
• A valuation v in an NmatrixM is a model of a sequent Γ⇒ ∆
(v |=M Γ⇒ ∆) iff either v |=M ψ for some ψ ∈ ∆, or v 6|=M ψ
for some ψ ∈ Γ.
• The sequent consequence relation induced byM is the
relation `sM on P(SeqL)× SeqL defined by:
Θ `sM Γ⇒ ∆ iff v |=M Γ⇒ ∆ whenever v |=M Θ.
• T `M ϕ iff {⇒ ψ | ψ ∈ T} `sM (⇒ ϕ).
If T is finite, then T `M ϕ iff `sM (T ⇒ ϕ).
 Systems For Reasoning with Sources
[¬¬⇒] Γ, ψ ⇒ ∆
Γ,¬¬ψ ⇒ ∆ [⇒¬¬]
Γ⇒ ∆, ψ
Γ⇒ ∆,¬¬ψ
[∧⇒] Γ, ψ, ϕ⇒ ∆
Γ, ψ ∧ ϕ⇒ ∆ [⇒∧]
Γ⇒ ∆, ψ Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ
Γ⇒ ∆, ψ ∧ ϕ
[¬∧⇒] Γ,¬ψ ⇒ ∆ Γ,¬ϕ⇒ ∆
Γ,¬(ψ ∧ ϕ)⇒ ∆ [⇒¬∧]
Γ⇒ ∆,¬ψ,¬ϕ
Γ⇒ ∆,¬(ψ ∧ ϕ)
[∨⇒] Γ, ψ ⇒ ∆ Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆
Γ, ψ ∨ ϕ⇒ ∆ [⇒∨]
Γ⇒ ∆, ψ, ϕ
Γ⇒ ∆, ψ ∨ ϕ
[¬∨⇒] Γ,¬ψ,¬ϕ⇒ ∆
Γ,¬(ψ ∨ ϕ)⇒ ∆ [⇒¬∨]
Γ⇒ ∆,¬ψ Γ⇒ ∆,¬ϕ
Γ⇒ ∆,¬(ψ ∨ ϕ)
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 What is a Canonical Rule?
• An “ideal” logical rule: an introduction rule for exactly one
connective, on exactly one side of a sequent.
• In its formulation: exactly one occurrence of the introduced
connective, no other occurrences of other connectives.
• The rule should also be pure (i.e. context-independent): no
side conditions limiting its application.
• Its active formulas: immediate subformulas of its principal
formula.
 What is a Canonical Rule? (Continued)
Stage 1.
Γ, ψ, ϕ⇒ ∆
Γ, ψ ∧ ϕ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆, ψ Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ
Γ⇒ ∆, ψ ∧ ϕ
Stage 2.
ψ,ϕ⇒
ψ ∧ ϕ⇒
⇒ ψ ⇒ ϕ
⇒ ψ ∧ ϕ
Stage 3.
{p1, p2 ⇒}/p1 ∧ p2 ⇒ {⇒ p1 ; ⇒ p2}/⇒ p1 ∧ p2
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 Canonical Systems
• A clause: a sequent consisting of atomic formulas.
• A canonical rule has one of the forms:
{Πi ⇒ Σi}1≤i≤m/  (p1, ..., pn)⇒
{Πi ⇒ Σi}1≤i≤m/⇒ (p1, ..., pn)
wherem ≥ 0 and for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m: Πi ⇒ Σi is a clause over
{p1, ..., pn}.
 Applications of Canonical Rules
The form of an additive application of the canonical rule
{Πi ⇒ Σi}1≤i≤m/  (p1, ..., pn)⇒:
{Γ,Π∗i ⇒ ∆,Σ∗i }1≤i≤m
Γ, (ψ1, ..., ψn)⇒ ∆
Here Π∗i and Σ
∗
i are obtained from Πi and Σi (respectively) by
substituting ψj for pj for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and Γ,∆ are any finite sets
of formulas (the context).
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 Example 1
Implication rules:
{p1 ⇒ p2} / ⇒ p1 ⊃ p2 {⇒ p1 ; p2 ⇒} / p1 ⊃ p2 ⇒
Their applications:
Γ, ψ ⇒ ∆, ϕ
Γ⇒ ∆, ψ ⊃ ϕ
Γ⇒ ∆, ψ Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆
Γ, ψ ⊃ ϕ⇒ ∆
 Example 2
Quasi-implication rules:
{⇒ p1 ; p2 ⇒} / p1  p2 ⇒ {⇒ p2} / ⇒ p1  p2
Their applications:
Γ⇒ ∆, ψ Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆
Γ, ψ  ϕ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ
Γ⇒ ∆, ψ  ϕ
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 Example 3
“Tonk” rules:
{p2 ⇒} / p1Tp2 ⇒ {⇒ p1} / ⇒ p1Tp2
Their applications:
Γ, ψ ⇒ ∆
Γ, ϕTψ ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕTψ
 What Sets of Rules are Acceptable?
• A standard Gentzen-type system is canonical if each of its
logical (i.e. non-structural) rules is canonical.
• If G is a canonical system, then `G is a structural and finitary
tcr. But is it a logic? i.e., is it also consistent?
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 Coherence
• A canonical calculus G is coherent if for every pair of rules
Θ1/⇒ (p1, ..., pn) and Θ2/  (p1, ..., pn)⇒, the set of clauses
Θ1 ∪Θ2 is classically unsatisfiable (and so inconsistent, i.e.,
the empty sequent can be derived from it using only cuts)
• For a canonical calculus G, `G is a logic iff G is coherent.
 Coherent Calculi:
{p1 ⇒} / ⇒ ¬p1 {⇒ p1} / ¬p1 ⇒
{p1, p2 ⇒} / p1 ∧ p2 ⇒ {⇒ p1 ; ⇒ p2} / ⇒ p1 ∧ p2
{p1 ⇒ p2} / ⇒ p1 ⊃ p2 {⇒ p1 ; p2 ⇒} / p1 ⊃ p2 ⇒
{⇒ p1 ; p2 ⇒} / p1  p2 ⇒ {⇒ p2} / ⇒ p1  p2
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 Non-coherent: “Tonk”!
{p2 ⇒} / p1Tp2 ⇒ {⇒ p1} / ⇒ p1Tp2
From these rules, we can derive p⇒ q for any p, q:
p⇒ p q ⇒ q
p⇒ pTq pTq ⇒ q
p⇒ q
 Exact Correspondence
Theorem: If G is a canonical calculus, then the following
statements are equivalent:
1. `G is consistent (and so it induces a logic).
2. G is coherent.
3. G has a characteristic two-valued Nmatrix.
4. G admits cut-elimination.
5. G admits strong cut-elimination.
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 Strong Cut Elimination (Propositional Case)
A Gentzen-type system G admits Strong cut-elimination if has the
following property:
{Γi ⇒ ∆i | i ∈ I} `G Γ⇒ ∆ iff there is a proof of Γ⇒ ∆ from
{Γi ⇒ ∆i | i ∈ I} in which all cuts are made on formulas in⋃
i∈I(Γi ∪∆i)
(In particular: `G Γ⇒ ∆ iff Γ⇒ ∆ has a cut-free proof in G).
Usually, if a system admits cut-elimination, it admits also strong
cut-elimination.
Applications: subformula property, decidability, proof search.
 How Can We Prove Strong Cut Elimination?
• Prove ordinary cut-elimination. Then prove the strong
cut-elimination by induction on the number of premises.
This works fine if the system is Pure (and closed under
weakening).
• Use some version of Gentzen’s syntactic proof for LK and LJ.
• Use semantic methods.
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 An Example: The Provability Logic GL
HGL: The Hilbert System for K (or K4) together with:
L (ϕ→ ϕ)→ ϕ
GGL: Gentzen System for propositional classical logic and:
ϕ,Γ′,Γ⇒ ϕ
Γ′,Γ⇒ ϕ
(
ϕ,Γ,Γ⇒ ϕ
Γ⇒ ϕ
)
Semantics: Irreflexive, transitive and finite Kripke frames.
 Semantics of Propositional GL
F = 〈WF , R, V 〉
• WF – A nonempty finite set
• R – An irreflexive and transitive binary relation on WF .
• V : WF ×FL → {t, f}
(i) V (a, ϕ→ ψ)=t iff v(a, ϕ)=f or v(a, ψ)=t
(ii) V (a,⊥) = f
(iii) V (a,ϕ) = t iff ∀b(aRb⇒ v(b, ϕ) = t)
ϕ is true in a ∈WF iff v(a, ϕ) = t
ϕ is valid in F iff ϕ is true in every a ∈WF
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 Semantics of Propositional GL (Continued)
• A t−model of ϕ is a pair 〈F, a〉 s.t. F is as above, a ∈WF and
ϕ is true in a.
• A v−model of ϕ is a triple F as above in which ϕ is valid.
• A t−model of Γ⇒ ∆ is a pair 〈F, a〉 as above s.t. ψ is false in a
for some ψ ∈ Γ or ϕ is true in a for some ϕ ∈ ∆.
• A v−model of Γ⇒ ∆ is a triple F as above s.t. 〈F, a〉 is a
t−model of Γ⇒ ∆ for every a ∈WF
 Main Results about GGL
1. GGL admits strong cut-elimination.
2. Let Θ be a set of sequents, and Γ⇒ ∆ a sequent.
Θ `GGL Γ⇒ ∆ iff every v−model of Θ is a v−model of Γ⇒ ∆.
Corollaries:
• T `tGGL ψ iff every t−model of T is a t−model of ψ.
• T `vGGL ψ iff every v−model of T is a v−model of ψ.
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 Proof of the Main Results about GGL
Let Θ = {Γ1 ⇒ ∆1, . . . ,Γn ⇒ ∆n},
SΘ = Γ1 ∪ Γ2 ∪ · · · ∪ Γn ∪∆1 ∪ · · ·∆n.
A good proof of Γ⇒ ∆ from Θ is a proof in which all cuts are on
formula in SΘ.
A sequent Γ′ ⇒ ∆′ is called saturated if:
(1) It consists of subformulas of SΘ ∪ Γ ∪∆
(2) Γ′ ⇒ ∆′ has no good proof.
(3) If ϕ→ ψ ∈ ∆′ then ϕ ∈ Γ′ and ψ ∈ ∆′
(4) If ϕ→ ψ ∈ Γ′ then ϕ ∈ ∆′ or ψ ∈ Γ′
· · ·
(*) If ϕ ∈ SΘ then ϕ ∈ Γ′ ∪∆′
 The Counter-model
Suppose that Γ⇒ ∆ has no good proof from Θ.
W : The set of saturated sequents
R: (Σ1 ⇒ Π1)R(Σ2 ⇒ Π2) if:
(i) If ϕ ∈ Σ1 then {ϕ,ϕ} ⊆ Σ2
(ii) There is at least one sentence of the form ψ in Σ2 − Σ1
V : V (Γ′ ⇒ ∆′, p) =
t p ∈ Γ′f otherwise
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 Main Lemmas about the Counter-model
(1) If ϕ ∈ Γ′ then v(Γ′ ⇒ ∆′, ϕ) = t
If ϕ ∈ ∆′ then v(Γ′ ⇒ ∆′, ϕ) = f
(2) R is transitive and irreflexive
(3) W is finite
(4) Γ⇒ ∆ is not valid in 〈W,R, V 〉
(*) Γi ⇒ ∆i (i = 1, . . . , n) are valid in 〈W,R, V 〉
Proof of (*): If Γ′ ⇒ ∆′ ∈W then Γi ∪∆i ⊆ Γ′ ∪∆′. It is impossible
that both Γi ⊆ Γ′ and ∆i ⊆ ∆′. Hence (*) follows from (1).
 FOL: The Case of LK
(∀ ⇒) Γ, ϕ(t/x)⇒ ∆
Γ,∀xϕ⇒ ∆
(∗) Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ
Γ⇒ ∆ ∀yϕ(y/x) (⇒ ∀)
(∗)
(∃ ⇒) Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆
Γ,∃yϕ(y/x)⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ(t/x)
Γ⇒ ∆,∃xϕ (⇒ ∃)
The starred rules are impure. Therefore `v 6=`t
√ ⇒ ψ⇒ ∀xψ X ψ ⇒ ∀xψy y
ψ `v ∀xψ ψ 6`t ∀xψ
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 FOL: The Case of LK (Continued)
The set
{(⇒ p(x)), (p(a)⇒ )} is inconsistent:
(Cut)
(⇒ ∀) ⇒ p(x)⇒ ∀xp(x) (∀ ⇒)
p(a)⇒
∀xp(x)⇒
⇒
However, there is no way to derive⇒ from this inconsistent set
without the logical rules for the quantifiers.
 The strong cut-elimination theorem for LK
Let LKS be LK+ the rule of substitution of terms for free variables:
Γ⇒ ∆
Γ{t/x} ⇒ ∆{t/x}
Let S be a set of sequents and suppose S `LKS Γ⇒ ∆.
Then there is a proof in LKS of Γ⇒ ∆ from S in which the
substitution rule is applied only to sequents in S, and all cuts are
on instances of formulae which occur in sequents of S.
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 Outline of a Syntactic Proof
First we use Gentzen’s method to show that all cuts which are not
on instances of formulae which occur in S are eliminable.
The substitution rule is needed at this stage when the cut formula
begins with a quantifier and we want to apply the induction
hypothesis to immediate subformulae of it.
Then we use induction on length of such proofs to show that all
applications of the substitution rule can be done on sequents in S.
 The Basis of Resolution
Let S be a set of clauses and s a clause such that S ` s. Let S′ be
a subset of S with the following properties:
• (1) S′ contains no tautology.
• (2) Each element in S is subsumed by some element of S′.
• (3) No element in S′ is subsumed by another element of S′.
Then there exists a clause s′ which subsumed s so that s′ can be
inferred from S′ using only substitutions and cuts.
Corollary: If S is an inconsistent set of clauses then there is a finite
set S′ of instances of clauses in S from which⇒ can be derived
using only cuts.
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La the´orie positive des hypothe`ses
Michel Bourdeau
Institut d’histoire et de philosophie des sciences et des techniques
(CNRS, Paris 1, ENS)
Abstract
In spite of its importance (it triggered the interest for the topic in the nineteenth
century), Comte’s theory of hypothesis has not received the attention it deserves,
and there has been no in-depth study of it since a paper by Laudan in 1971.
The argument takes its starting point in the fact that there is more in our ways
of reasoning than induction and deduction. Science could not progress without
scientists resorting to hypothesis, that is, moving away from data, assuming some
phenomenon, drawing consequences from it and asking if they agree or not with
facts. Then, the question is: what kind of hypothesis is admissible, what kind is not?
Comte’s answer is often dismissed as verificationist but there is much more to
say about it. When he spoke about unverifiable hypothesis, he had in mind instances
like phlogiston, calorific or “e´ther luminife`re”, which were still quite common in
his time, and he relied on the pioneer thermodynamical works of Fourier, who
precisely began by rejecting this very kind of hypothesis; but the theory has also to
be understood in relation to his anti-metaphysical stance. The influence of Comte’s
theory can be seen in the work of Duhem but mainly in Peirce’s theory of abduction.
Au de´but du dix-neuvie`me sie`cle, l’ide´e que les sciences expe´rimentales seraient des
sciences inductives e´tait encore tre`s re´pandue. La the´orie des hypothe`ses expose´e dans
la vingt-huitie`me lec¸on du Cours de philosophie positive (1830-1842)1 constitue donc
une contribution novatrice, puisque son point de de´part se trouve dans le refus d’une
telle position : l’induction ne suffit pas, il est impossible de s’en tenir aux seules donne´es
et le savant n’a d’autre issue que de prendre les devants. Bien plus, dans l’e´conomie
ge´ne´rale de la philosophie comtienne des sciences, l’expose´ canonique de cette the´orie,
qui occupe la fin de la vingt-huitie`me lec¸on, constitue un dispositif central, pole´mique et
proble´matique2.
1Pour les œuvres de Comte, les abre´viations suivantes seront utilise´es :
– C Cours de philosophie positive (1830-1842). On renvoie a` l’e´dition Hermann, 2 volumes, Paris,
1975 (1er vol., lec¸ons 1-45 ; 2e vol., lec¸ons 46-60) ; pour les lec¸ons 46-51, nous renvoyons a` la
nouvelle e´dition en cours, Paris, Hermann, 2012.
– TPAP Traite´ philosophique d’astronomie populaire (1844), Paris, Fayard, 1985.
– S Syste`me de politique positive (1851-1854), Paris, L. Mathias, 4 volumes. On donne le volume
puis la page.
2Parmi les e´tudes consacre´es a` la question, il en est deux de remarquables, que le lecteur est instamment
invite´ a` consulter :
– Laudan, L. :  Towards a Reassessment of Comte’s “Me´thode Positive.” , Philosophy of Science
38 (1971), 35-53 ; repris dans Science and Hypothesis: Historical Essays on Scientific Methodology.
Dordrecht, D. Reidel 1981 ;
– Bachelard, G. : Etude sur l’e´volution d’un proble`me de physique, Paris, Vrin 1973 (la premie`re e´dition est
de 1927), chap. 4, 55-72.
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Le dispositif est central pour les sciences expe´rimentales, le recours a` l’hypothe`se
y jouant un roˆle capital ; mais il est aussi central pour la philosophie positive, ce qui
ne doit pas surprendre, les sciences expe´rimentales servant en quelque sorte de mode`le
de la positivite´. En ce sens, la the´orie des hypothe`ses est inse´parable d’une re´flexion
plus ge´ne´rale sur la nature de la positivite´, ce qui ne va pas sans cre´er d’assez se´rieuses
difficulte´s.
Le caracte`re pole´mique de la the´orie re´sulte directement de cette situation. Si Comte
parle des hypothe`ses, c’est en raison de leur fe´condite´ : leur usage est rigoureusement
indispensable en science. Mais cet aspect pourtant primordial passe vite au second plan.
Une fois la porte ouverte, il convient de ne pas laisser passer n’importe quoi ; aussi le
plus clair de la discussion consistera a` de´terminer dans quelles conditions une hypothe`se
peut eˆtre tenue pour recevable, c’est-a`-dire positive. La the´orie prend ainsi la forme d’une
critique de certains types d’hypothe`ses, et les partisans de ces dernie`res ne se sont pas
prive´s de contre attaquer, accusant Comte de poser des limitations arbitraires a` l’activite´
du savant. Une bonne partie des objections adresse´es a` la philosophie positiviste des
sciences s’est ainsi cristallise´e autour de la the´orie des hypothe`ses, pre´sente´e comme une
des meilleures marques de son e´troitesse d’esprit). Pour les adversaires du positivisme,
tout se passe comme si critiquer la me´taphysique revenait ipso facto a` eˆtre scientiste, et
la question est de savoir s’ils ont raison de nous enfermer dans une telle alternative.
Si l’on cherche maintenant a` se faire une premie`re ide´e de ce que dit cette the´orie,
il suffira a` ce stade de retenir qu’elle pre´sente deux versants, positif et ne´gatif. Le
premier consiste a` tenir l’hypothe`se comme une simple anticipation sur l’expe´rience
future. C’est un artifice essentiellement provisoire et a` ce titre e´liminable. Le versant
ne´gatif consiste alors a` exclure les hypothe`ses qui ne satisfont pas a` ces exigences, et
elles sont nombreuses. Les hypothe`ses me´taphysiques, bien suˆr ; mais Comte estime
que, sur ce point, la bataille est a` peu pre`s gagne´e. Si donc la the´orie est l’occasion d’un
approfondissement de la notion de positivite´, c’est qu’elle conduit a` exclure e´galement
les succe´dane´s de me´taphysique qu’a produit ce que Comte appelle un positivisme
incomplet ou un positivisme baˆtard.
Comte lui-meˆme reconnaissait que la fonction fondamentale des hypothe`ses en
physique e´tait  difficile a` analyser (C, 28e l., 456). Des indications qu’il a fournies, il
n’est pas toujours aise´ de de´gager un sens clair et univoque et le jugement porte´ variera
beaucoup avec l’interpre´tation retenue. Il est assez suˆr toutefois que l’histoire ne s’est
pas engage´e dans la voie qu’il souhaitait et que le positivisme baˆtard qu’il condamnait
compte encore beaucoup d’adeptes. Paralle`lement, le travail accompli en philosophie
des sciences nous permet d’avoir aujourd’hui une vue plus pre´cise et plus exacte du roˆle
et de la nature des hypothe`ses dans les sciences expe´rimentales. En conclure que Comte
n’aurait plus rien a` nous apprendre serait toutefois bien haˆtif et des esprits aussi e´minents
que Peirce ou Duhem ont pris cette doctrine assez au se´rieux pour entreprendre de la
de´velopper. La difficulte´ se concentre autour de la the´orie expose´ dans le Cours mais,
avant de l’examiner en de´tail, il convient de la placer dans un contexte plus ge´ne´ral.
La spontane´ite´ de l’esprit et les divers usages d’hypothe`se
Signe de l’importance qu’il accorde de fac¸on ge´ne´rale au raisonnement hypothe´tique,
Comte est revenu sur le sujet a` diverses reprises, notamment dans lesConclusions ge´ne´rales
du Cours, puis dans le Syste`me de politique positive (1851-1854) et, si l’usage qu’il fait
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du terme ne se conforme pas toujours aux re`gles prescrites dans la vingt-huitie`me lec¸on,
c’est que celles-ci ne sont destine´es a` s’appliquer que dans un contexte bien spe´cifique.
Le premier point qui se de´gage est que, a` travers la the´orie des hypothe`ses, c’est  le
genre de liberte´ reste´ facultatif pour notre intelligence qui est en jeu (C, 58e l., 735).
Le primat accorde´ a` l’observation sur l’imagination ne signifie en aucune fac¸on une
adhe´sion a` l’empirisme de la table rase. L’imagination n’est pas moins indispensable en
science qu’en art et l’adoption de la me´thode subjective apre`s 1848 ne fera que donner
une part croissante a` cette liberte´ spe´culative. L’hypothe`se est un proce´de´ qui trouve
son origine non hors de nous, mais dans la spontane´ite´ d’un esprit qui  n’est jamais
passif dans ses relations avec le monde (S, III, 19). — Celle-ci se manifeste encore sous
d’autres formes et, aux coˆte´s de l’hypothe`se, la me´thode positive fait e´galement une place
a` des fictions scientifiques, comme ces  organismes fictifs, artificiellement imagine´s,
qu’elle propose d’intercaler entre les organismes connus  de manie`re a` faciliter leurs
comparaison, en rendant la se´rie biologique plus homoge`ne et plus continue, en un
mot plus re´gulie`re3. — Comte est ainsi conduit a` faire un usage assez varie´ du terme
hypothe`se. La dynamique sociale, par exemple, repose sur  l’hypothe`se d’un peuple
unique. Encore qualifie´e de  fiction rationnelle (C, 48e l., 171) car il ne s’agit pas
d’en de´duire des conse´quences, l’ide´e emprunte´e a` Condorcet est de´crite comme une
ide´alisation destine´e a` ordonner les donne´es et simplifier le re´cit en introduisant une
continuite´ non atteste´e dans l’histoire. De la meˆme fac¸on, le tome deux du Syste`me
nous invite a` conside´rer l’hypothe`se d’un monde sans lois, ou celle d’un pays de cocagne
(respectivement S, II, 28-29 et 141-149). Ce sont la` des expe´riences de pense´e et non
plus des ide´alisations : dans les deux cas, la situation en question est reconnue comme
contrefactuelle, et il s’agit d’en explorer les conse´quences, ou les facettes, pour ensuite la
comparer avec la re´alite´, dans le seul but de mieux caracte´riser celle-ci.
La cinquante huitie`me lec¸on avait de´ja`, sinon assoupli les conditions formule´es dans
la vingt-huitie`me lec¸on, du moins e´largi le cadre the´orique dans lequel elles s’inscrivent.
Y est introduite en effet une distinction jusqu’alors absente, qui e´tend la sphe`re de la
positivite´. Une fois exclues les causes, et a` s’en tenir a` la seule recherche des lois, deux
types de question peuvent en effet se pre´senter : certaines sont simplement pre´mature´es,
alors que d’autres portent sur des sujets  inde´finiment inaccessibles, quoique de nature
positive  (C, 58e l., 735). Le premier cas rentre directement dans le cadre de la
the´orie des hypothe`ses. Le second revient a` admettre l’existence de questions  que
l’esprit humain ne saurait certainement re´soudre jamais, et qui me´ritent cependant d’eˆtre
qualifie´es de positives, parce qu’on peut concevoir qu’elles deviendraient accessibles a`
une intelligence mieux organise´e4. En de´pit de cette profonde diffe´rence, le principe
utilise´ dans le premier cas, mais plus libe´ral que celui de 1835, s’applique e´galement :
 former les suppositions les plus propres a` faciliter notre marche mentale, sous la double
3C, 40e l., 728. Comte dit emprunter l’ide´e aux mathe´matiques ou`  on a souvent trouve´ de grands
avantages a` imaginer directement une suite quelconque de cas hypothe´tiques, dont la conside´ration, quoique
simplement artificielle, peut faciliter beaucoup, soit l’e´claircissement plus parfait du sujet naturel des
recherches, soit meˆme son e´laboration fondamentale. Un tel artifice diffe`re essentiellement de celui des
hypothe`ses proprement dites, avec lesquelles il a e´te´ toujours confondu jusqu’ici par les plus profonds
philosophes. Dans ce dernier cas, la fiction ne porte que sur la seule solution du proble`me ; tandis que,
dans l’autre, le proble`me lui-meˆme est radicalement ide´al, sa solution pouvant eˆtre, d’ailleurs, entie`rement
re´gulie`re. Voir encore 60e l., 786.
4C, 58e l., 735 ; Comte pense sans doute ici a` l’eˆtre omniscient dont parle Laplace dans l’introduction de
son Essai philosophique sur les probabilite´s.
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condition permanente de ne choquer aucune notion ante´rieure, et eˆtre toujours dispose´
a` modifier ces artifices, aussitoˆt que l’observation viendrait a` l’exiger (Ibid.). Comte
donne aussitoˆt deux exemples :  l’hypothe`se, spontane´ment adopte´e en physique, sur
la constitution mole´culaire des corps, pourvu toutefois qu’on ne lui attribue jamais une
vicieuse re´alite´ et  l’artifice fondamental du dualisme en chimie5. Dans la trente
sixie`me lec¸on duCours, il avait en effet propose´ de conside´rer toute composition chimique
comme re´sultant d’une suite de combinaisons, et donc ultimement comme binaire ; en
prenant soin d’ajouter :  je ne propose point le dualisme universel et invariable comme
une loi re´elle de la nature, que nous ne pourrions jamais avoir aucun moyen de constater ;
mais je le proclame un artifice fondamental de la vraie philosophie chimique, destine´ a`
simplifier toutes nos conceptions e´le´mentaires, en usant judicieusement du genre spe´cial
de liberte´ reste´ facultatif pour notre intelligence 6. De`s lors qu’on voit dans un tel
proce´de´ un simple artifice logique et non une loi naturelle, qu’on ne confond pas le
subjectif et l’objectif, rien ne s’oppose a` son emploi.
La the´orie de la vingt-huitie`me lec¸on
Ce cadre une fois fixe´, il devient possible d’entrer plus en de´tail dans l’examen de la
the´orie expose´e a` la fin de la vingt-huitie`me lec¸on du Cours. Si ces pages ne constituent
pas la vue de´finitive de Comte sur le sujet, les de´veloppements ulte´rieurs ne forment
que de bre`ves remarques, alors qu’on a affaire ici a` un expose´ de´taille´ et c’est pourquoi,
depuis Mill, c’est sur lui que s’est concentre´e la discussion.
Apre`s avoir brie`vement constate´ l’impossibilite´ a` rendre compte de la de´marche
expe´rimentale au moyen des seuls proce´de´s reconnus d’ordinaire par les logiciens, a`
savoir la de´duction et l’induction, et la ne´cessite´ qui s’ensuit de recourir a` un autre type
de raisonnement consistant a`  anticiper sur les re´sultats, en faisant une supposition
provisoire, d’abord essentiellement conjecturale, quant a` quelques-unes des notions
meˆmes qui constituent l’objet final de la recherche, Comte s’empresse d’ajouter :
Mais, l’emploi de ce puissant artifice doit eˆtre constamment assujetti a` une
condition fondamentale, a` de´faut de laquelle il tendrait ne´cessairement, au
contraire, a` entraver le de´veloppement de nos vraies connaissances. Cette
condition, jusqu’ici vaguement analyse´e, consiste a` ne jamais imaginer que
des hypothe`ses susceptibles, par leur nature, d’une ve´rification positive,
plus ou moins e´loigne´e, mais toujours clairement ine´vitable, et dont le
degre´ de pre´cision soit exactement en harmonie avec celui que comporte
l’e´tude des phe´nome`nes correspondants. En d’autres termes, les hypothe`ses
vraiment philosophiques doivent constamment pre´senter le caracte`re de
simples anticipations sur ce que l’expe´rience et le raisonnement auraient pu
de´voiler imme´diatement, si les circonstances du proble`me eussent e´te´ plus
favorables7.
Qui cherche a` comprendre ce que Comte demande d’une bonne hypothe`se et ce
5Nous parlerions aujourd’hui d’hypothe`se atomique ; la restriction explique qu’a` la fin du dix-neuvie`me
sie`cle, les positivistes aient e´te´ hostiles a` l’atomisme.
6C, 36e l., 602 ; voir encore S, I, 553-554. L’hypothe`se a vite e´te´ critique´e par Laurent, qui lui reprochait
de multiplier inutilement les niveaux d’analyse.
7Dans ce qui suit, il ne sera pas question de cet aspect de la condition qui porte sur le degre´ de pre´cision
requis des hypothe`ses. Sur ce point, on se reportera a` l’ouvrage de Bachelard cite´ n. 1.
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qu’il rejette se heurte vite a` toute sorte de difficulte´s, que deux principes d’interpre´tation
aideront a` de´meˆler. Tout d’abord, l’analyse doit eˆtre a` la fois conceptuelle et historique,
une des conclusions de l’expose´ e´tant pre´cise´ment que  la philosophie des sciences ne
saurait eˆtre convenablement e´tudie´e se´pare´ment de leur histoire (C, 28e l., 464 ; cf. 49e
l., 237, qui renvoie a` ce passage). De plus, l’analyse se meut tour a` tour au plan descriptif
et au plan normatif. On ne comprendrait rien a` la the´orie fondamentale des hypothe`ses
si on ne voyait qu’elle entend re´pondre a` la situation que l’auteur avait sous les yeux. Le
positivisme baˆtard est d’abord un fait, de l’ordre du constat. Mais, dans la pratique des
savants de son temps, Comte croit ne´cessaire de faire le partage entre la bonne pratique,
telle qu’illustre´e par Fourier, et la mauvaise.
La place accorde´e a` l’astronomie illustre bien ce jeu du descriptif et du normatif. La
pratique des astronomes est en effet donne´e en mode`le aux physiciens, confirmant une
fois de plus le caracte`re exemplaire de la plus ancienne des sciences naturelles.
Tel fait est encore peu connu, ou telle loi est ignore´e : on forme alors a`
cet e´gard une hypothe`se, le plus possible en harmonie avec l’ensemble des
donne´es de´ja` acquises ; et la science, pouvant ainsi se de´velopper librement,
finit toujours par conduire a` de nouvelles conse´quences observables, suscep-
tibles de confirmer ou d’infirmer, sans aucune e´quivoque, la supposition
primitive (C, 28e l., 458).
Les lec¸ons d’astronomie ou le Traite´ de 1844 contiennent ainsi de nombreux exemples
d’un usage irre´prochable de l’hypothe`se. Ainsi, ce que l’humanite´ a longtemps observe´
dans le ciel, c’e´tait uniquement la constance des diverses configurations d’e´toiles, et leur
de´placement re´gulier d’est en ouest ; mais cela ne suffisait pas a` l’astronome pour rendre
compte des apparences et pre´voir la position future des astres. Aussi l’astronome a-t-il
pose´ l’existence d’une vouˆte ce´leste, d’une sphe`re des fixes ayant pour centre la terre.
Telle est, ajoute Comte,  la premie`re grande conception scientifique que l’esprit humain
ait duˆ former. Sans doute, nous n’y attachons plus le meˆme sens que les anciens, qui
y voyaient l’expression absolue de la re´alite´ ; mais a` titre d’artifice astronomique, elle
comportera toujours la meˆme efficacite´ habituelle8.
Le fait que l’examen d’une question aussi importante que celle qui nous occupe
ait e´te´ reporte´ aux lec¸ons de physique, alors pourtant que c’est l’astronomie qui nous
enseigne le bon usage des hypothe`ses, indique le sens pole´mique ou, si l’on pre´fe`re, la
fonction pre´ventive que Comte accorde a` cette the´orie. Les astronomes se conformant
spontane´ment a` la condition fondamentale e´nonce´e plus haut, il n’e´tait pas ne´cessaire
de la formuler explicitement. Tel n’est toutefois plus le cas quand on passe d’une science
a` l’autre :
Les diverses hypothe`ses employe´es aujourd’hui par les physiciens doivent
eˆtre soigneusement distingue´es en deux classes : les unes, jusqu’ici peu
multiplie´es, sont simplement relatives aux lois des phe´nome`nes ; les autres,
dont le roˆle actuel est beaucoup plus e´tendu, concernent la de´termination des
agents ge´ne´raux auxquels on rapporte les diffe´rents genres d’effets naturels.
(C, 28e l., 458).
8TPAP, 122. La de´termination de la figure de la terre fournit un autre exemple de la fac¸on dont l’esprit
humain a e´te´ amene´ a` forger une suite d’hypothe`ses de plus en plus satisfaisantes. Voir TPAP, 155-156 et
les lec¸ons correspondantes du Cours.
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Il est meˆme possible de pre´ciser davantage la cible vise´e. Deux des branches de la
physique, la barologie ou the´orie de la gravitation, la thermologie ou the´orie de la
chaleur, ont en effet suivi le mode`le de l’astronomie et se sont de´barrasse´es des hypothe`ses
du second type. Bachelard a notamment montre´ de fac¸on convaincante tout ce que, sur
le point qui nous occupe, Comte doit a` Fourier, un des deux de´dicataires du Cours9.
Reste donc seulement l’e´tude de la lumie`re et de l’e´lectricite´. Alors que Fourier nous a
appris comment faire l’e´conomie du calorique, dans ces deux derniers cas, on continue a`
admettre l’existence d’un fluide e´lectrique ou d’un e´ther luminife`re. Or, objecte Comte,
l’existence de ces pre´tendues entite´s n’est
pas plus susceptible de ne´gation que d’affirmation, puisque, d’apre`s la consti-
tution qui leur est soigneusement attribue´e, ils e´chappent ne´cessairement a`
tout controˆle positif. Quelle argumentation se´rieuse pourrait-on instituer
pour ou contre des corps ou des milieux dont le caracte`re fondamental
est de n’en avoir aucun ? Ils sont expresse´ment imagine´s comme invisibles,
intangibles, imponde´rables meˆme, et d’ailleurs inse´parables des substances
qu’ils animent : notre raison ne saurait donc avoir sur eux la moindre prise
(C, 28e l., 459).
La lumie`re inde´pendante du corps lumineux, ou l’e´lectricite´ se´pare´e du corps e´lectrique
ne diffe`rent des entite´s scolastiques que par une corpore´ite´  fort e´quivoque, puisqu’on
leur oˆte expresse´ment, par leur de´finition fondamentale, toutes les qualite´s susceptibles
de caracte´riser une matie`re quelconque (C, 28e l., 461).
Si ce type d’hypothe`se n’a donc pas sa place en science, reste a` expliquer pourquoi la
de´cision de les exclure se heurte a` une telle re´sistance. La re´ponse propose´e renvoie a`
la structure de l’esprit humain, telle qu’elle ressort de la loi des trois e´tats. Quoique
la me´taphysique ne constitue elle-meˆme [. . .] qu’une grande transition ge´ne´rale de la
the´ologie a` la science re´elle, une transition secondaire, et, par la`, beaucoup plus rapide,
devient ensuite ne´cessaire entre les conceptionsme´taphysiques et les conceptions vraiment
positives  (Ibid.). Cet e´tat de la physique, qualifie´ pour cette raison de positivisme
incomplet ou baˆtard, constitue donc un interme´diaire historiquement indispensable, mais
voue´ a` disparaıˆtre de`s lors qu’il a rempli sa fonction, comme le montre l’exemple de la
the´orie carte´sienne des tourbillons : historiquement conside´re´e, en introduisant l’ide´e
d’un me´canisme quelconque, elle repre´sentait un incontestable progre`s par rapport aux
explications propose´es un peu plus toˆt par Kepler mais, ce service une fois rendu, il a
bien fallu se re´soudre a` l’abandonner.
La the´orie des hypothe`ses constitue bien une des pie`ces maıˆtresses de l’e´piste´mologie
positiviste. Le recours a` l’hypothe`se e´tant rigoureusement indispensable en science, on
voit mal comment l’e´piste´mologue pourrait ne pas l’e´tudier. Preuve de la distance qui
se´pare la pense´e de Comte des doctrines qui lui sont d’ordinaire attribue´es, l’hypothe`se
est d’abord pour lui une libre cre´ation de l’esprit. A ce titre, elle est semblable aux
fictions qu’il n’he´sitait pas a` introduire en science pour faciliter la marche du savant.
9Voir le texte de Bachelard, cite´ n. 1, qui conclut en ces termes : Ainsi, on peut justifier, a` bien
des points de vue, la prudence scientifique de Comte. L’intransigeance de sa re´action contre l’esprit
me´taphysique e´tait elle-meˆme ne´cessaire dans une pe´riode ou` la science pre´tendait assurer ses fondations.
On ne peut pas refuser a` Comte une claire vision des conditions scientifiques de son e´poque, et surtout la
compre´hension exacte de l’organisation et de la discipline qui sont indispensables pour faire travailler a`
plein rendement la socie´te´ savante.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Une comparaison avec cet autre type d’artifice logique permet de mieux en saisir la
spe´cificite´. Tout d’abord, l’hypothe`se est un instrument heuristique, le point de de´part
d’un raisonnement qui nous permet d’augmenter nos connaissances, tandis que la fiction
n’est pas la` pour qu’on en de´duise quoi que ce soit. La fe´condite´ de l’hypothe`se est
lie´e e´galement a` son caracte`re transitoire d’anticipation. Si Comte insiste tant sur son
e´liminabilite´, c’est qu’il y voit le gage de sa positivite´ : l’hypothe`se est destine´e, non pas a`
garder inde´finiment le statut d’hypothe`se, mais a` devenir l’e´nonce´ d’un fait ou d’une loi,
comme la monnaie est destine´e a` eˆtre e´change´e pour une marchandise10. A la diffe´rence
de la fiction, elle e´met la pre´tention a` de´crire  par provision  la re´alite´ et, une fois
connu le verdict de l’expe´rience, elle sera accepte´e, ou rejete´e.
La the´orie comtienne des hypothe`ses combine les approches conceptuelle et historique.
Il convient de la lire dans le meˆme esprit et de la replacer dans son contexte. On en
comprendmieux alors le caracte`re hautement pole´mique, qui se re´clamait a` juste titre des
travaux de Fourier sur la chaleur. Il y avait de bonnes raisons de vouloir se de´barrasser
des fluides ou de l’e´ther et autres entite´s qui encombraient la the´orie physique. Duhem
a cherche´ a` construire une optique conforme aux canons positivistes et la the´orie de
l’abduction de Peirce est donne´e explicitement comme la reprise du projet comtien11.
10En de´pit des apparences, Comte n’est pas ve´rificationiste. Il savait tre`s bien que les lois scientifiques
 ne sont jamais que des hypothe`ses assez confirme´es par l’observation (S, II, 33). Parmi les hypothe`ses
disponibles a` un moment donne´, on choisit celle qui s’accorde le mieux avec les donne´es expe´rimentales. La
question de la figure de la terre donne un bon exemple d’une suite d’hypothe`ses de plus en plus satisfaisantes.
Voir e´galement C, 24e l., 391, ou` Comte reconnaıˆt que le refus des notions absolues conduit a` admettre que
meˆme les lois qui nous paraissent les mieux e´tablies, comme a` son e´poque les lois de Newton, ne sont pas a`
l’abri de re´futation.
11Voir respectivement : M. Blay :  Comte et Duhem ou la construction d’une optique positive,
Revue philosophique, 2007-4, 493-504 et Peirce, pour qui  the true maxim of abduction is that which
Comte endeavored to formulate when he said that any hypothesis might be admissible if and only if it was
verifiable (in : Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism (1903 ; Lecture VI: the Nature of Meaning) ; in Houser,
N. and Kloesel, Ch. (eds) : The Essential Peirce, Bloomington, Indiana U. P., 1992, vol. 2, 225.
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Seligman-style deduction for hybrid modal logic
Patrick Blackburn, Torben Brau¨ner*, Klaus Frovin Jørgensen
Roskilde University, Denmark
and
Thomas Bolander
Technical University of Denmark
Abstract. A number of different sorts of proof-systems for modal logics are available:
Major examples are labelled systems, display logics, multiple sequents, and hybrid-logical
systems. It is not the purpose of this talk to discuss the pros and cons of all these systems,
but instead to focus on one particular sort of proof-system based on hybrid modal logic,
which is an extension of ordinary modal logic allowing explicit reference to individual
points in a Kripke model (the points stand for times, locations, states, possible worlds,
or something else).
This sort of proof-system was put forward by Jerry Seligman in the late 1990s [4].
One particular feature of this sort of system is the possibility to jump to a hypothetical
time (or whatever the points stand for), do some reasoning, and then jump back to the
present time again. In natural deduction versions [2] the hypothetical reasoning is kept
track of using machinery called explicit substitutions, similar to “proof-boxes” in the
style of linear logic. Such a hybrid-logical proof-box encapsulates hypothetical reasoning
taking place at one particular time. Within the proof-box, information depending on
the hypothetical time can be dealt with, but only non-indexical information, that is,
statements whose truth-values do not depend on the time, can flow in and out of the box.
In my talk I’ll present Seligman-style natural deduction, and I’ll in particular discuss
the above mentioned machinery enabling hypothetical reasoning. I’ll also briefly describe
two other lines of work in the area of Seligman-style reasoning:
1. Seligman-style natural deduction has turned out to be useful for formalizing so-called
false-belief tests in cognitive psychology [3].
2. Recently developed Seligman-style tableau systems with desirable proof-theoretic
properties [1].
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Explanatory Justice:
The Case of Disjunctive Explanations
Michael Cohen
Mu¨nchen
Abstract. In recent years there has been an effort to explicate the concept of explanatory
power in a Bayesian framework, by constructing explanatory measures. It has been
argued that those measures should not violate the principle of explanatory justice, which
states that explanatory power cannot be extended ‘for free’. I argue, by formal means,
that one recent measure that was claimed to be immune from explanatory injustice fails
to be so. Thereafter, I propose a conceptual way of avoiding the counterintuitive side
effects of the discussed formal results. I argue for another way of understanding the
notion of ‘extending explanatory success’, for the cases of negative explanatory power.
A consequence of this interpretation is that the original explanatory justice criticism
disappears. Furthermore, some of the formal results derived from explanatory measures
can be made conceptually clear under this kind of understanding.
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An introduction to deduction
Kosta Dosˇen
Mathematical Institute, SANU
Abstract. To determine what deductions are it does not seem sufficient to know that
the premises and conclusions are propositions, or something in the field of propositions,
like commands and questions. It seems equally, if not more, important to know that
deductions make structures, which in mathematics we find in categories, multicategories
and polycategories. It seems also important to know that deductions should be members
of particular kinds of families, which is what is meant by their being in accordance with
rules.
Negating indicative conditionals
Paul Egre´
CNRS, Institut Jean-Nicod, Paris
Abstract. Negation is often viewed as a “litmus test” for theories of indicative con-
ditionals in natural language (see Handley, Evans and Thompson 2006). Three main
families of semantic theories compete when it comes to understanding the interaction of
negation with conditional sentences, namely i) suppositional analyses inspired by the
Ramsey Test, according to which the negation of “if P then Q” is of the form “If P then
not Q”; ii) the two-valued truth-functional analysis according to which the negation
should be a conjunction of the form “P and not Q” and iii) strict conditional analyses
predicting a weak negation of the form “possibly P and not Q”. We present the results
of several experimental studies concerning the denial of indicative conditional sentences
in dialogues, intended to show that all three forms of negations can be retrieved from
the weak negation, depending on the additional assumptions available to the denier of
the conditional.
(Joint work with Guy Politzer.)
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On a dogma of Proof-Theoretic Semantics:
generalising canonicity of derivations
Nissim Francez
Computer Science dept., the Technion-IIT, Haifa, Israel
(francez@cs.technion.ac.il)
and
Julien Murzi
School of European Culture and Languages,
University of Kent, UK
and Munich centre for Mathematical Philosophy
(j.murzi@kent.ac.uk)
Introduction
– A dogma within the PTS community: I-rules of a meaning-conferring
ND-system fully determine meanings.
– As a result, there emerged a conception of a canonical proof ends with
an I-rule.
– Recently, canonicity was extended to arbitrary derivations from open
assumptions, again “essentially” ending with an I-rule.
– A canonical derivation is the most direct way of concluding a formula
from some assumptions which are taken as grounds for assertion of the
conclusion.
– This dogma has some far-reaching consequences:
- the notion of harmony, central to PTS, requires a balance between the
I-rules and E-rules (only).
- One way in which harmony was formalized is by the existence of
derivation reductions removing maximal formulas, formulas which are
the conclusion of an I-rule and major premises of an E-rule.
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Our goal
– Harmony is taken as a necessary condition for the proof-theoretic justi-
fication of a logic, the heart of the PTS programme.
- Consequently, many PTS-adherers reject Classical Logic, where in its
standard presentation the E-rule for negation, the double negation elimi-
nation (DNE) lacks harmony, and prefer Intuitionistic Logic, the standard
ND-system of which NJ does enjoy harmony.
– We claim that the focus of PTS has to be on direct grounds (for
assertion), which need not necessarily coincide with I-rules.
- Sometimes, notably for disjunctions, such grounds may arise differently.
- In particular, we suggest that in ND-systems that have primitive struc-
tural rules (S-rules) allowing the conclusion of formulas, not just the
manipulation of assumptions, a derivation ending with such a rule should
also count as canonical, also providing grounds for assertion of its con-
clusion.
Justification
– Classicality by proof-theoretic kosher means is typically gotten by
strengthening the structural resources of the meaning-conferring system,
e.g.:
- the coordination principles in bilateral systems, or multiple conclusions
in both sequent calculi and ND-systems.
- Since these resources allow us to assert new theorems, such as Peirce’s
Law, LEM and more, it may be justly thought that they are meaning-
determining;
- they license new uses of disjunction, implication etc.
- If those meanings are to be accounted for in terms of canonical grounds,
the notion of a canonical ground needs to be enriched and expanded
accordingly.
– Furthermore, an S-rule can also eliminate a formula, similarly to an
E-rule.
This is particularly significant for the pragmatist account of PTS, accord-
ing to which the E-rules fully determine meaning.
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The consequence
– As a consequence of this suggestion, there emerges a need for a revision
of the definition of harmony.
– A balance is required between ways of introduction on the one hand
(here applications of both I-rules and S-rules), and ways of elimination
on the other hand (here applications of E-rules and, again, of S-rules).
- The establishment of this balance leads to the consideration of additional
derivation reductions, on top of the usual detour elimination reductions,
only confronting I-rules with E-rules.
The conception of self-justifying, meaning-conferring rules is thereby
extended.
Classifying Structural rules
– S-rules are further divided as follows:
- Sa-rules: These are S-rules that only manipulate assumptions, like
Gentzen’s original rules (for single conclusion) Weakening, Contraction
and Exchange. Typically in ND-systems, Sa-rules are not taken as prim-
itive; rather, they are absorbed into the identity axiom.
- Si-rules: Those are structural rules that allow the introduction of a
conclusion, like some coordination rules in the bilateral presentation of
Classical Logic (below), or right weakening in themultiple-concusions
presentation of classical logic (also below).
- Se-rules: Those are structural rules that allow the elimination of a
conclusion, again like the coordination rules in the bilateral presentation
of Classical Logic, or right contraction in the multiple-confusions presen-
tation of classical logic.
- We assume the usual notion of a tree-like derivation, ranged over by D.
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S-canonicity, grounds, bridge formula
Definition: A derivation D is S-canonical iff its last step is one of the
following:
1. An application of an “essential” I-rule.
2. An application of an Si-rule.
- Denote S-canonical derivability by `sc.
Definition: Γ is a grounds for assertion for ϕ iff `sc Γ : ϕ.
Definition: A formula ϕ occurring as a node in a derivation D is a
bridge formula iff it is either a conclusion of an application of an I-rule or
of an Si-rule, and at the same time the major premise of an application
of an E-rule or a premise of an application of Se-rule.
- The notion of a maximal formula is a special case of a bridge formula,
when the formula is introduced via an I-rule and immediately afterwards
eliminated via an E-rule.
Local-soundness
– We now cast harmony, known also as local-soundness, in terms of
reducing derivations containing a bridge formula.
Definition: An ND-system is S-locally-sound iff every derivation con-
taining a bridge formula can be reduced to an equivalent one (having
the same conclusion and the same (or fewer) open assumptions) where
that bridge formula does not occur.
– This definition gives rise to four kinds of reductions:
- I/E-reductions: These are the traditional detour-removing reductions,
eliminating occurrences of maximal formulas.
- I/Se-reductions: These reductions eliminate bridge formulas introduced
via an I-rule and eliminated via an Se-rule.
- Si/E-reductions: These are reductions eliminating a bridge formula
introduced via an Si-rule and eliminated via an E-rule.
- Si/Se-reductions: These are purely structural reductions, eliminating
bridge formulas introduced via an Si-rule and eliminated via an Se-rule.
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A bilateral justification of Classical Logic
+ϕ +ψ
+(ϕ ∧ ψ) (∧
+I)
+(ϕ ∧ ψ)
[+ϕ]i, [+ψ]j
...
+ξ
+ξ
(∧+Ei,j)
+ϕ
+(ϕ ∨ ψ) (∨
+I1)
+ψ
+(ϕ ∨ ψ) (∨
+I2)
+(ϕ ∨ ψ)
[+ϕ]i
...
+ξ
[+ψ]j
...
+ξ
+ξ
(∨+Ei,j)
[+ϕ]i
...
+ψ
+(ϕ→ ψ) (→
+ I i)
+(ϕ→ ψ) +ϕ
[+ψ]i
...
+ξ
+ξ
(→+ Ei)
−ϕ
−(ϕ ∧ ψ) (∧
−I1)
−ψ
−(ϕ ∧ ψ) (∧
−I2)
−(ϕ ∧ ψ)
[−ϕ]i
...
ξ
[−ψ]j
...
ξ
ξ
(∧−EI, j)
−ϕ −ψ
−(ϕ ∨ ψ) (∨
−I)
−(ϕ ∨ ψ)
[−ϕ]i, [−ψ]j
...
ξ
ξ
(∨−Ei,j)
+ϕ −ψ
−(ϕ→ ψ) (→
− I)
−(ϕ→ ψ)
[+ϕ]i, [−ψ]j
...
ξ
ξ
(→− Ei,j)
Defining negation bilaterally
−ϕ
+¬ϕ (¬+I)
+¬ϕ
−ϕ (¬+E)
+ϕ
−¬ϕ (¬−I)
−¬ϕ
+ϕ (¬−E)
– The definition of negation is based on the approach that asserting ¬ϕ
is warranted by denying ϕ, and denying ¬ϕ is warranted by denying ¬ϕ.
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Coordination rules
– The classical strength effect of the two forces of assertion and denial is
established by means of appropriate structural rules, under the name of
coordination rules, extending the meaning of the underlying derivability
relation.
- For the expression of those rules,⊥ is used, viewed not as a propositional
constant but as a logical punctuation sign. Consequently it does not
occur with a force marker attached.
Γ,+ϕ,−ϕ : σ (INC)
Γ : σ Γ : σ
Γ : ⊥ (LNC)
Γ, σ : ⊥
Γ : σ
(REDi)
- (INC) establishes the incoherence of n context, that cannot be coher-
ently used in deductions. (explosion).
- (LNC) and (RED) allow for a reversal of the judgement (in both
directions), once a contradiction is reached.
Some derived rules
– A useful derived bilateral structural rule is (Co), expressing contraposi-
tion displayed in its logistic presentation with explicit contexts:
Γ, β : α
Γ, α : β
(Co)
- Contraposition leads to another useful structural rule, called here
(Cases), to be used in the reductions.
Γ,+ϕ : ξ Γ,−ϕ : ξ
Γ : ξ
(Cases)
- Notably, if ⊥ is considered a propositional constant, the rule (RED)
is impure. An alternative, pure form of a bilateral Reduction structural
rule, evading the use of ⊥, was proposed by Smiley:
[σ]i
...
α
[σ]j
...
α
σ
(SRi,j)
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S-harmony of the bilateral system
– Only I/E-reductions and Si/E-reductions have to be considered, as
there are no Se-rules.
- The I/E-reductions were presented elsewhere and skipped here.
–Sample Si/E-reductions are presented, showing there is no need to
eliminate after inferring via the Si-rule (RED).
- For each connective, there are separate reductions for the two force
markers.
Implication
Assertion:
D2
+ϕ
[−(ϕ→ ψ)]i
D1⊥
+(ϕ→ ψ) (RED
i)
+ψ
(→+ E)  r
D2
+ϕ [−ψ]j
−(ϕ→ ψ) (→
− I)
D1⊥
+ψ
(REDj)
Denial: Two negative E-rules.
[+(ϕ→ ψ)]i
D1⊥
−(ϕ→ ψ) (RED1)
+ϕ (→− Ei)  r
[−ϕ]i
+(ϕ→ ψ) (∗)
D1⊥
+ϕ (REDi)
(∗):
[ϕ]i [+ϕ]j [−ψ]k
⊥ (LNC)
+ψ
(REDk)
+(ϕ→ ψ) (→
+ Ij)
[+(ϕ→ ψ)]i
D1⊥
−(ϕ→ ψ) (RED
i)
−ψ (→
− E2)  r
[+ψ]i
+(ϕ→ ψ) (→
+ I l)
D1⊥
−ψ (RED
i)
41
Conjunction
Assertion:
[−(ϕ ∧ ψ)]i
D1⊥
+(ϕ ∧ ψ) (RED
i)
+ϕ (∧+E1)  r
[−ϕ]j
−(ϕ ∧ ψ) (∧
−I1)
D1⊥
+ϕ (RED
j)
Denial:
[+(ϕ ∧ ψ)]i
D1⊥
−(ϕ ∧ ψ) (RED
i)
[−ϕ]j
D2
ξ
[−ψ]j
D3
ξ
ξ
(∧−Ej,k)
 r
[+ϕ]i [+ψ]j
+(ϕ ∧ ψ) (∧
+I)
D1⊥
−ϕ (REDi)
D2
ξ
[−ψ]k
D3
ξ
ξ
(Casesj,k)
A multiple-conclusions justification of Classical Logic
ϕ,∆ ψ,∆
ϕ ∧ ψ,∆ (∧I)
ϕ ∧ ψ,∆
ϕ,∆
(∧1E) ϕ ∧ ψ,∆ψ,∆ (∧2E)
ϕ,∆
ϕ ∨ ψ,∆ (∨1I)
ψ,∆
ϕ ∨ ψ,∆ (∨2I)
ϕ ∨ ψ,∆
ϕ, ψ,∆
(∨E)
[ϕ]i
D
ψ,∆
ϕ→ ψ,∆ (→ I
i)
ϕ→ ψ,∆ ϕ,∆
ψ,∆
(→ E)
[ϕ]i
D
∆
¬ϕ,∆ (¬I
i)
¬ϕ,∆ ϕ,∆
∆
(¬E)
∆
ϕ,∆
(RW )
ϕ, ϕ,∆
ϕ,∆
(RC)
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S-harmony of the MCND-system
– Note that right contraction (RC) is an Se structural rule, while right
weakening (RW ) is an Si rule.
- Thus, we have to show the Si/E-reductions establishing local-soundness
in reducing derivation in which a formula is concluded by weakening and
immediately eliminated.
- In addition, we have to show the I/Se-reductions, where the introduced
formula ϕ is already in ∆, and is immediately eliminated by RC.
- Finally, there are also Si/Se-reductions, where a formula ϕ ∈ ∆ is
introduced by right weakening and immediately eliminated via right
contraction.
- The I/E-reductions were presented elsewhere and are omitted.
Sample reductions
– Si/E-reductions: The common structure of all the Si/E-reductions
is that weakening followed by elimination is reduced to weakening only
(once or twice).
Implication:
D′
ϕ,∆
D
∆
ϕ→ ψ,∆ (RW )
ψ,∆
(→ E)  r
D
∆
ψ,∆
(RW )
Conjunction:
D
∆
ϕ ∧ ψ,∆ (RW )
ϕ,∆
(∧E1)  r
D
∆
ϕ,∆
(RW )
Negation:
D
∆
¬ϕ,∆ (RW ) D
′
ϕ,∆
∆
(¬E)  r
D
∆
Si/Se-reductions: Here there is only one reduction to consider.
D
ϕ,∆
ϕ, ϕ,∆
(RW )
ϕ,∆
(RC)  r
D
ϕ,∆
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Hypersequents and Linear Time
Andrzej Indrzejczak
Institute of Philosophy UŁ, Ło´dz´
Abstract. Hypersequent calculi (HC) are a generalised form of sequent calculi invented
independently by Pottinger and Avron. Hypersequents are usually defined as finite sets
or multisets of ordinary sequents. HC proved to be very useful in the field of nonclassical
logics including several modal, many-valued, relevant, and paraconsistent logics. We
consider the application of HC to temporal logics of linear time. The first approach
based on Avron’s rule for modelling linearity is sufficient for dealing with logics such as
S4.3 or K4.3 where only future-looking operators are taken into account. In order to
provide cut-free formalizations of bimodal logics such like Kt4.3 where past-looking
operators are added we need a different solution. The second approach is based on
hypersequents treated as finite sequences of sequents. This solution is more expressive
in the sense that the symmetry of past and future in linear time may be modelled by
suitable rules.
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Axioms as Hypotheses
Reinhard Kahle
CENTRIA, CM, and DM, FCT
Universidade Nova de Lisboa
2829-516 Caparica, Portugal
kahle@mat.uc.pt
Hypothetical Reasoning
23–24 August 2014, Tu¨bingen
Research supported by the Portuguese Science Foundation, FCT, through the
projects Hilbert’s Legacy in the Philosophy of Mathematics, PTDC/FIL-FCI/109991/
2009 and The Notion of Mathematical Proof, PTDC/MHC-FIL/5363/2012.
Reinhard Kahle Axioms as Hypotheses Hypothetical Reasoning 1 / 15
The notion of Axiom
1 Traditional notion
I True statement
I Self-evident assumption
2 Modern notion
I Starting point for formal reasoning
I Arbitrary assumption
Truth disappeared
Evidence disappeared
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Non-Euclidean Geometry
If there are alternatives for the parallel axiom which give rise to a
consistent description of a “geometric reality”, in which mathematical
sense one of the versions of the parallel axiom could be true, and the
other could be false?
Of course, the parallel axiom could still be empirically true (relativity
theory suggests today that this is not the case).
But empricial truth would, in any case, not be the truth
mathematicians are after.
And even if so, self-evidence would be gone for sure.
Side question:
The distinguished German mathematician Hans Grauert (1930–2011) tried
to give additional evidence for Euclidean Geometry (by use of an interesting
“homothety principle”), calling Euclidean Geometry truer than the other
geometries.
Is it philosophically possible to have a (non-trivial) comparative of “true”??
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Bernhard Riemann
Riemann might have been the first(?) to change
explicitely from “Axiom” to “Hypothesis”:
Bernhard Riemann, 1854
These matters of fact are—like all matters of
fact—not necessary, but only of empirical certainty;
they are hypotheses.
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Hilbert’s Axiomatic Method
David Hilbert proposed the Axiomatic Method
to set up (formal) mathematical theories to
investigate all kinds of research areas.
Doing so, the notion of axiom became
increasingly disconnected from its traditional
meaning.
For Hilbert, the justification of an axiom
system was now given by its raw consistency.
Frege opposed to this, and see also Peano’s comment on the next
slide, but the historical development confirmed Hilbert.
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Peano
Giuseppe Peano, 1906
But a proof that a system of postulates for arithmetic, or for geometry,
does not involve a contradiction, is not, according to me, necessary. For we
do not create postulates at will, but we assume as postulates the simplest
propositions that are written, explicitly or implicitly, in every text of
arithmetic or geometry. Our analysis of the principles of these sciences is a
reduction of the ordinary affirmations to a minimum number, that which is
necessary and sufficient. The system of postulates for arithmetic and
geometry is satisfied by the ideas of number and point that every writer of
arithmetic and geometry has. We think number, therefore number exists.
A proof of consistency of a system of postulates can be useful, if the
postulates are hypothetical and do not correspond to real facts.
(cited from Hubert C. Kennedy, Peano, Reidel, 1980, p. 118f)
Thus, Peano still made a distinction between (tradtional) axioms and
hypotheses.
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Bourbaki
As latest with the rise of modern abstract algebra, the notion of
axiom has entirely shifted away from truth and evidence.
Just think of the axioms for a group.
Nicholas Bourbaki, 1950
It goes without saying that there is no longer any
connection between this interpretation of the word
“axiom” and its traditional meaning of “evident
truth”.
(N. Bourbaki, The Architecture of Mathematics, The
American Mathematical Monthly, 57(4), 1950, p. 225)
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David Hilbert
It is one thing to call axioms hypotheses (as Riemann did) . . .
it is, however, another thing to give hypotheses the status of axioms,
as Hilbert suggeted:
David Hilbert, 1922
Nothing prevents us from taking as axioms propositions which are
provable, or which we believe are provable. Indeed, as history shows, this
procedure is perfectly in order: [. . . ] Riemann’s conjecture about the
zeroes of ζ(s), [. . . ]
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Axioms as Hypothesis
What is the difference of treating Riemann’s Hypothesis (RH) as an
axiom instead of as a “usual” hypothesis?
A mathematical statement φ using RH as a hypothesis would be
proven in a theory T as follows:
T ` RH → φ.
Using RH as an axiom would change the situation to:
T ∪ {RH} ` φ.
This seems to be an easy application of the deduction theorem.
However, the situation is different, as T ∪ {RH}—understood as a set
of axioms—receives an autonomous status.
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Side remark: Principia Mathematica
An illustrating example of a comparable (in fact, inverse) situation
can be found in Whitehead and Russell’s Principia Mathematica.
PM does not state the axiom of infinite (Inf); instead, when needed,
a theorem is formulated in the form Inf→ . . . .
PM has, however, the axiom of reducibility (Red).
Avoiding Inf as axioms, allows to stay within the logicist paradigm.
Why not doing the same with Red?
Alasdair Urquhart conjectured that the different treatment of Inf and Red is
simply due to the number of instances where the respective axiom is needed;
in fact, Red is needed in PM much more often than Inf.
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Potentially inconsistent theories
What is the problem with T ∪ {RH} as a set of axiom?
It could be inconsistent.
Let assume, for the sake of the argument, that it would be
inconsistent.
I In the case of T ` RH → φ we would just have studied a (now)
trivially true sentence.
I In the case of T ∪ {RH} ` φ we would have studied an “empty”
theory, one which doesn’t even has any meaningful interpretation.
Should we believe that Hilbert suggested to study “potentially
meaningless theories”?
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The challenge
Can we attribute a meaningful semantics to a potentially inconsistent
theory like T ∪ {RH}, and to our work in such a theory?
Any usual model-theoretic semantics has to fail here!
Our proposal: a proof-theoretic semantics
Or even: a proof semantics
Reinhard Kahle Axioms as Hypotheses Hypothetical Reasoning 12 / 15
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Idea of a proof semantics
Thesis
The semantics of a proof (not only the the proven formula!) can be find in
the concrete derivation given in the proof.
In particular, if we have T ` φ the semantics should take into account
“only” the subset T0 ⊂ T of axioms actually used in the derivation.
In this way, the semantics is local with respect to the single derivation.
The advantage should be clear: even, if T turns out to be
inconsistent, T0 might be consistent and the performed proof can
savely carried over to another axiom system.
Thus, even in an inconsistent theory, we might have two proofs T ` φ
and T ` ψ with incompatable φ and ψ. But the proofs T0 ` φ and
T1 ` ψ for different T0,T1 ⊂ T might be meaningful in different
consistent subsystems of T .
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Historic examples
Frege’s Grundgesetze
As much as we can judge, the last situation holds for Frege’s
Grundgesetze.
Frege, of course, does not use, anywhere, explicitly Russell’s paradox
and the ex-falso-quodlibet to obtain a formula.
In contrast, all of his derivations seem to be “locally” meaningful.
Modern work on different consistent subsystems of Frege’s
Grundgesetze supports this view.
Reinhardt cardinal
A Reinhardt cardinal, which turned out to be inconsistent over ZFC
(but unkown to be consistent or inconsistent over ZF only!), is
another example.
Work on a Reinhardt cardinal done at the time where it was not
known to be incosistent does not seem to be “meaningless” work.
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Conclusion
Following Hilbert there should be no (philosophical) difference any
longer between Axiom and Hypothesis.
Treating axiom systems, in general, as “arbitrary” sets of assumptions
(hypotheses), rises the question of potentially inconsistent axiom
systems.
Such systems (may) lack a model-theoretic semantics.
Proof(-theoretic) semantics can step in.
Reinhard Kahle Axioms as Hypotheses Hypothetical Reasoning 15 / 15
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A joint logic of problems and propositions, a modified
BHK-interpretation and proof-relevant topological
models of intuitionistic logic
Sergey Melikhov
Steklov Mathematical Institute
Abstract. In a 1985 commentary to his collected works, Kolmogorov remarked that his
1932 paper (“Zur Deutung der intuitionistischen Logik”) “was written in hope that with
time, the logic of solution of problems will become a permanent part of [a standard]
course of logic. Creation of a unified logical apparatus dealing with objects of two types
– propositions and problems – was intended.” We describe such a formal system, QHC,
which is a conservative extension of both the intuitionistic predicate calculus, QH, and
the classical predicate calculus, QC. Moreover:
• The only new connectives ? and ! of QHC induce a Galois connection (i.e., a pair
of adjoint functors) between the Lindenbaum algebras of QH and QC, regarded
as posets.
• Kolmogorov’s double negation translation of propositions into problems extends
to a retraction of QHC onto QH.
• Go¨del’s provability translation of problems into modal propositions extends to a
retraction of QHC onto its QC + (? !) fragment, which can be identified with the
modal logic QS4.
This leads to a new paradigm that views intuitionistic logic not as an alternative to
classical logic that criminalizes some of its principles, but as an extension package that
upgrades classical logic without removing it. The purpose of the upgrade is proof-
relevance, or “categorification”; thus, if the classical conjunction and disjunction are
to be modeled by intersection and union (of sets), the intuitionistic conjunction and
disjunction will be modeled by product and disjoint union (of sheaves of sets). More
formally, we describe a family of sheaf-valued models of QH, inspired by dependent
type theory (not to be confused with the well-known open set-valued sheaf models of
QH), which can be regarded as proof-relevant analogues of classical topological models
of Tarski et al., and which extend to models of QHC. We also give an interpretation
of some of these models in terms of stable solutions of algebraic equations; this can be
seen as a proof-relevant counterpart of Novikov’s classical interpretation of some Tarski
models in terms of weighting of masses.
The new paradigm also suggests a rethink of the Brouwer–Heyting–Kolmogorov
interpretation of QH. Traditional ways to understand intuitionistic logic (semantically)
have been rooted either in philosophy – with emphasis on the development of knowledge
(Brouwer, Heyting, Kripke) or in computer science – with emphasis on effective oper-
ations (Kleene, Markov, Martin-Lo¨f). Our ”modified BHK interpretation” is rooted
in the usual mathematical ideas of canonicity and stability; it emphasizes simply the
order of quantifiers, developing Kolmogorov’s original approach. This interpretation is
compatible with two complete classes models of QH: (i) Tarski topological models and
(ii) set-theoretic models of Medvedev–Skvortsov and La¨uchli; as well as with (iii) our
sheaf-valued models.
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Truth-value gaps and paradoxes
of material implication
Grigory Olkhovikov
Ural Federal University
Abstract. One of the uses of multi-valued logic is to overcome some restrictions of
the classical two-valued one. A particularly well-known set of restrictions is connected
with analysis of conditionals in two-valued logic, where one finds so called paradoxes of
material implication. One of these paradoxes is basically as follows: a conditional with
false antecedent is a truth-value gap from a commonsense point of view, but is true in
two-valued logic.
Resources of three-valued logic provide an obvious solution to this paradox: that is
to say, interpret sentences exhibiting truth-value gap as having the third (non-designated)
truth-value and define implication accordingly. Strange enough, this way out was not
seriously tried until recently. In our talk we recapitulate the main results obtained thus
far about a three-valued logic which realizes this kind of definition for implication
together with natural definitions for disjunction, conjunction and quantifiers. We briefly
address complete and consistent Hilbert-style axiomatizations for this logic (for both
propositional fragment and full first-order version) and its expressive power.
Cuts and Graphs
Zoran Petric´
Mathematical Institute, SANU
Abstract. Plural (or multiple-conclusion) cuts are inferences made by applying a
structural rule introduced by Gentzen for his sequent formulation of classical logic. As
singular (single-conclusion) cuts yield trees, which underlie ordinary natural deduction
derivations, so plural cuts yield graphs of a more complicated kind, related to trees. The
graphs of plural cuts are interesting in particular when the plural cuts are appropriate for
sequent systems without the structural rule of permutation. The aim of this talk, which
is based on a joint work with Kosta Dosˇen, is to define these graphs both inductively
and in a pure combinatorial manner.
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Rules, types and the transcendence
of second order logic
Paolo Pistone
Universita` di Roma Tre
Abstract. As soon as formulas of the form “there exists an X such that . . .” or “for
all integers n . . .” are involved, the justification of logical rules by harmony (i.e. cut-
elimination) looks like an empty shell: the intrinsic circularity of such arguments is
indeed so harmful that we cannot, without accepting some preconceived assumptions,
decide between “sound” and “paradoxical” versions of the Hauptsatz for higher order
logics.
The aim of this talk is to argue that the acceptance of this fundamental form
of ignorance (intimately related to the incompleteness theorems) makes room for a
constructive understanding of second order logic.
Counterfactual logics:
natural deduction calculi and sequent calculi
Francesca Poggiolesi
CNRS-CEPERC (UMR 7304), Aix-en-Provence
Abstract. Counterfactual logics, which have a long and venerable history [3, 1, 2], have
been introduced to capture counterfactual sentences, i.e. conditionals of the form “if A
were the case, then B would be the case”, where A is false. If we interpret counterfactuals
as material conditionals, we have that all counterfactuals are trivially true and this is an
unpleasant conclusion. By means of counterfactual logics, on the other hand, we can
give a different and meaningful interpretation of counterfactual sentences.
There are several different systems of counterfactual logics. Amongst them we focus
on the system CK and its standard extensions, namely CK + {ID,MP,CEM}. These
systems have a simple and useful semantics. One just needs to consider a set of possible
worldsW , and a selection function f; for each world i and each formulaA,f selects the
set of worlds of W which are closer to i given the information A. Thus a counterfactual
sentence A > B is true at a world i if, and only if, B is true at all those worlds that are
closer to i given the information A.
In this talk we aim at presenting a method for generating sequent calculi and natural
deduction calculi for the system CK and its extensions. The method is based on and fully
exploits the simple semantics interpretation of such systems. Sequent calculi and natural
deduction calculi are proved to be equivalent; moreover, as for the natural deduction
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calculi, we prove that the derivations normalize; while, as for the sequent calculi, we
prove they are contraction-free, weakening-free and cut-free and that their logical rules
are all invertible.
References
[1] Lewis, D., Counterfactuals. Basil Blackwell, 1973.
[2] Nute, D., Topics in Conditional Logic. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1980.
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How do vacuous truths become laws?
Erdinc¸ Sayan
Department of Philosophy
Middle East Technical University
esayan@metu.edu.tr
The use of idealizations and approximations is pervasive in science. Idealizations and
approximations are assumptions or hypotheses which are known to be patently false.
They enter into a scientific analysis or explanation in basically two ways. First, they may
be conjoined to a theory as extraneous hypotheses, mainly to make it easier to work
with the theory. Second, they may be embodied in the very statement or formulation of
laws and theories; I call such laws idealizational laws. Thus, for example, assuming that
the universe contains only two bodies is an idealizing hypothesis that may be used in
some contexts as input to the law of gravitation and Newton’s second law of motion. On
the other hand, insofar as Newton’s second law is conceived as applying only to point
masses, that law contains an idealization as part of its content. In this paper I confine
myself to an examination of the problems of testing pertaining to idealizational laws.
Consider the simple conception that scientific laws are unrestricted universal state-
ments of the form “∀x(Fx→Gx)”,where the arrow sign is understood to denote material
implication. If we assume the adequacy of this material-conditional interpretation of
laws, the following problem arises. If no object instantiates the antecedent, as when,
for example, F refers to the property of being a point mass or a frictionless plane, the
law “∀x(Fx→Gx)” is true “vacuously.” But of course we cannot be content with our
laws being true vacuously, for in such laws the consequent can be any statement whatso-
ever and the “law” would be true. If we adopt the material-conditional model of laws,
explaining the possibility of falsifying idealizational laws, which are true (vacuously),
becomes an acute problem for Popperian falsificationism, for example.
There are difficulties for the falsificationist view even if we don’t treat laws as material
conditionals, however, as we shall see when we look at the hypothetico-deductivist
theory of confirmation. (I shall hereafter use ‘h-d’ as short for “hypothetico-deductivist,”
“hypothetico-deductivism,” or “hypothetico-deductive.”) The usual h-d theory faces
problems in accounting for confirmation anddisconfirmation of idealizational hypotheses.
According to one classical formulation of the h-d account we have the following schemata
for confirmation and disconfirmation of an hypothesisH :
(HD 1) Confirmation: Disconfirmation:
H ` e→ f true H ` e→ f true
e true e true
f true ∼f true
∴ H may be true ∴ H false
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Here H may be a law or theory, ‘`’ stands for logical entailment, and e and f are
evidential statements.1 Notice that (HD 1) does not presuppose H to be a material
conditional. Now, letH be the idealizational law known as the ideal-gas law that says
“All ideal gases obey PV = kT .” This law entails the statement, “If g is an ideal gas,
then g obeys PV = kT ,” for any given object g. So the confirmatory schema takes the
following shape:
All ideal gases obey PV = kT ` If g is an ideal gas, then g obeys PV = kT true
g is an ideal gas true
g obeys PV = kT true
∴ All ideal gases obey PV = kT may be true
Since ideal gases do not exist, the second premise of this confirmatory argument cannot
ever be satisfied. The same premise occurs also in the corresponding disconfirmatory
argument. As a result, the ideal-gas law turns out to be neither confirmable nor
disconfirmable on the h-d account; every object is irrelevant as far as being evidence
for the law.2 This is in contrast to falsificationism: every “rigorous attempt” to test
the ideal-gas law by trying to find negative instances of it would be bound to fail,
and of course we already know that. The same goes of course for any contrary of the
ideal-gas law, such as “All ideal gases obey P2/V 7 = kT 3” or “No ideal gas obeys
PV = kT .” Hence the falsificationist method, as it stands, seems inapplicable in the
case of idealizational generalizations, because trying to corroborate them is hopeless.
Testability of idealizational generalizations turns out to be a problem also for
another popular theory of confirmation: the Bayesian theory. According to this theory,
1Cf. Braithwaite 1983, pp. 45–46. For simplicity, these two schemata leave out the auxiliary hypotheses
and initial conditions which need to be conjoined withH to secure entailment of e→f byH . Also, (HD 1)
needs to be supplemented with a clause saying that e does not entail f without the help of H , i.e. it is not
the case that e `f. Otherwise we would be allowing any hypothesis to be confirmed in the event that e is
true and entails f; for if e `f, then H ` e→ f for any H . For traditional logical positivists e and f must
contain only observational terms and logical constants.
2The h-d model is sometimes given a cruder form. Let us look at how this alternative formulation
confronts the problem of idealizational laws. On this version of h-d, we have these schemata:
(HD 2) Confirmation: Disconfirmation:
H `E true H `E true
E true ∼E true
∴ H may be true ∴ H false
E here represents the evidence statement. If we take E to be the conditional e→ f of the previous version
(HD 1), we get a problem: the falsehood of e would suffice to make E true, and hence to confirmH . To
illustrate this in terms of our ideal-gas example, we obtain from (HD 2):
All ideal gases obey PV = kT ` If g is an ideal gas, then g obeys PV = kT true
If g is an ideal gas, then g obeys PV = kT true
∴ All ideal gases obey PV = kT may be true
Thus every object g which is not an ideal gas would satisfy the second premise and hence its observation
would confirm the ideal-gas law. Since in fact no object is an ideal gas, it follows that observation of any
object constitutes confirming evidence for the ideal-gas law. This is in stark contrast to (HD 1), according
to which no object has, as we have seen, any confirmatory or disconfirmatory relevance to that law.
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incremental confirmation occurs just in case the posterior probability of a hypothesis
is greater than the prior probability of that hypothesis on a given piece of evidence.
So we have incremental confirmation of hypothesis H by evidence E if and only if
Pr(H | E & B) > Pr(H | B), where B is the background knowledge (or conjunction of
background assumptions). And incremental disconfirmation ofH by E occurs on the
Bayesian account if and only if Pr(H | E & B) < Pr(H | B).3 Now, if our background
knowledge B gives us strong reasons to believe thatH is an idealizational hypothesis,
i.e. a generalization that refers to nonexistent entities such as ideal gases, frictionless
surfaces, perfect vacuum conditions, uniform electromagnetic fields and the like, then
B tells us that we cannot find any actual evidence forH . That is to say, we know that
we can never find ideal gases, perfect vacuums or perfectly elastic springs to serve as
conditions or media to gather evidence for confirming or disconfirming H . It follows
that testing of idealizational generalizations is not possible by the standard Bayesian
criteria of incremental confirmation and disconfirmation. On the other hand, if we were
to stick to the material-conditional model of laws, our background knowledge would
entail that idealizational generalizations are (almost certainly) vacuously true. This
means Pr(H | B) ≈ 1, which is to say that H is “absolutely confirmed” in Bayesian
terminology. Hence, the Bayesian theory would grant every idealizational universal the
status of very highly or absolutely confirmed law—whether the universal makes any sense
or not. But of course some idealizational generalizations are confirmed while others are
disconfirmed in science.
So how are idealizational generalizations tested? Let us consider this answer: They
are tested by turning them into approximate generalizations. Here is a suggestion about
how to do it. Consider once again our generic idealizational generalization4:
(IL) ∀x(Fx→Gx)
Instead of interpreting our generalization as stating that everything that is F is also G ,
let us interpret it more loosely as asserting “Every x which is approximately F is also
approximately G .” And let us express this approximate law symbolically as:
(AL) ∀x (≈Fx→≈Gx)
where ‘≈Fx’ stands for “x is approximately F ,” and similarly for ‘≈Gx.’ Even if there
exist no objects in the world that are F , there may exist objects that are approximately F .
Thus let us assume that there are no perfect vacuums in the world as a matter of
nomological fact, and that therefore the following law of falling bodies belongs to the
category of idealizational law:
(IFB) All bodies falling in perfect vacuum at the surface of the earth fall a height
given by h = 12gt
2.
g above is the gravitational acceleration at the surface of the earth and t is the duration
of the fall. In accordance with (AL), we can interpret this law as asserting the following:
3There is neither confirmation nor disconfirmation ofH by E if and only if Pr(H |E &B) = Pr(H |B).
4My use of the material conditional sign ‘→’ hereafter is only for expository purposes and does not
reflect a commitment to the material-conditional interpretation of laws on my part. If one wants, one could
read it as a stronger conditional than material conditional, say, as a “nomological conditional.”
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(AFB) All bodies falling in an approximate vacuum at the surface of the earth fall
a height given by h ≈ 12gt2.
We can then test this approximative version of the law, so the suggestion goes, in the
usual way—whether in accordance with the h-d model, the falsificationist recipe, the
Bayesian account or some other theory of confirmation.
It may be that a tacit assumption on the part of most philosophers that an ideal-
izational generalization can easily be converted into an approximative hypothesis in
this fashion is what has been responsible for those philosophers’ neglect of a careful
study of how idealizational laws and theories get confirmed. However, this simple way of
converting an idealizational generalization into an approximative one is not unproblem-
atic. An obvious problem is determining how approximate is approximate enough in a
given context. How are we to decide what should count as an approximate vacuum, for
example, and how much discrepancy between the values of h and 12gt
2 should we allow
to count h ≈ 12gt2 as holding? In short, what should be the criteria for deciding when
≈Fx and ≈Gx are true and when they are false? In the case of the law of falling bodies,
feathers and parachutes will always fall more slowly than stones, unless the medium
of fall is a perfect vacuum and not a merely approximate one. But a perfect vacuum is
not attainable (or so we are assuming). So, if we want the approximative version of the
law of falling bodies (AFB) to be confirmed both by feathers and stones, we need some
criteria that would qualify a medium as approximately a vacuum and at the same time
ensure that h ≈ 12gt2 is satisfied by both stones and feathers. That doesn’t seem to be a
feasible thing to do.
I think there is a more satisfactory way of confirming the idealizational law of
falling bodies (IFB) while effectively disconfirming its contraries, than turning it into
the approximative law of falling bodies (AFB). Our confidence in (IFB) actually derives
from the fact that, for any given object, the more the conditions of its fall approximate to
being in perfect vacuum, the more closely it obeys h = 12gt
2. As we experimentally make
the medium come closer and closer to a vacuum, we will observe that h for feathers as
well as for stones will approach 12gt
2. In the case of feathers, closing of the gap between
h and 12gt
2 will be more drastic than stones, since stones more closely obey h = 12gt
2
to begin with. But both feathers and stones will converge to h = 12gt
2 as a common
limit. (And the difference in their rates of convergence can plausibly be accounted for in
terms of the differences in the air resistance they experience.) If the opposite occurred,
i.e. progressively closer approximations to perfect vacuum conditions did not result in
progressively closer approximations of h to 12gt
2 for some objects, this would prompt
us to look for an explanation of this misbehavior. Should our attempts to explain the
misbehavior fail, we come to regard the law as disconfirmed.
It seems that part of the meaning of an idealizational law (indeed of most laws, if not
all) is that, as the property in its antecedent is more closely instantiated by an object, the
property in its consequent is better approximated by that object. The counterpart of this
is also implicit in what the law asserts: If closer instantiation of the antecedent-property
of the law by any object failed to lead to closer approximation of its consequent-property
by that object, then the law would fail, i.e. would be disconfirmed. Thus I propose
the following modification on (AL), which gives us the “progressively approximative”
interpretation of an idealizational law:
(PAL) ∀x (≈↑Fx→≈↑Gx)
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Here ‘≈↑Fx’ stands for “x approximates progressively more to being an F ” and ‘≈↑Gx’
stands for “x approximates progressively more to being a G .” Confirmatory instances
of this reading of an idealizational law are those cases where making the experimental
conditions more closely approximate to the idealizational antecedent F results in
improved approximation of actual observations to G . And disconfirmatory instances
of it are those where improved approximation to F does not make actual observations
more closely approximate to G .
Sometimes, after observing an object in one medium, instead of letting it actually
fall in another medium which more closely approximates to a vacuum than the first one,
we may have reason to think that had we let it fall in this second medium, it would have
come closer to obeying h = 12gt
2. When such counterfactual reasoning is cogent, we
tend to count the law as confirmed by the object.5
The relation between the counterfactual
If an object had been let to fall in mediumM2, which more closely approxi-
mates to a vacuum than mediumM1, it would have come closer to obeying
h = 12gt
2
and the (PAL) reading of the idealizational law of falling bodies is noteworthy in the
following respect. The truth of a relevant counterfactual is usually thought to testify
to the lawlikeness of an ordinary, nonidealizational generalization. (We say that a
lawlike generalization “supports” its relevant counterfactuals.) But the truth of the
counterfactual above is not only an indication of the lawlikeness of (PAL), but also
provides a confirmatory argument for it.
Here is how another idealizational law, the ideal-gas law, can be confirmed in
accordance with its (PAL) form. Some of the properties of an ideal gas are that its
molecules are point masses, and those molecules engage in totally elastic collisions with
the walls of the vessel. Now take two real gases: radon and helium. We know that helium
comes closer in its relevant properties to an ideal gas than radon does. The molecules
of helium are closer to being point masses, for example, than the molecules of radon,
which are much bigger than helium molecules. The collisions between the walls of the
vessel and helium molecules are closer to being elastic collisions than are the collisions
between the walls of the vessel and radon molecules. And so on. As a result, the equation
of state for helium better approximates to PV = kT , the equation of state for an ideal
gas, than does the equation of state for radon. The ideal-gas law can thus be confirmed
by real gases! This is compatible with saying that this law is actually a false description
of the behavior of real gases. For the ideal-gas law does not, strictly speaking, purport to
correctly describe a real gas—it is about ideal gases.6
There is an intriguing question in connection with (PAL). Could it turn out for some
laws that no object can even approximately—much less progressively-approximately—
instantiate the antecedent of it? In other words, what if there exists no object which, for
some F , can (progressively) approximate F ? Now, if (progressive) approximation to F
5The analysis in the previous paragraph and this one, as well as some of the other ideas expounded in
this paper, carry a family resemblance to Ronald Laymon’s theory of confirmation in Laymon 1985. I am
grateful to him for his comments and suggestions some years back on the issues discussed in this paper.
6The behavior of real gases confirms the ideal-gas law by another way also. When a real gas in a closed
vessel becomes diluted after we expand the volume of the vessel, its equation of state comes closer to
PV = kT . Diluting the gas decreases the forces of cohesion among its molecules, thus bringing it closer to
an ideal gas, which is assumed to lack intermolecular forces of cohesion.
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cannot be instantiated by any object in the world, this would mean that the domain of
the law consists of purely fictional objects. Unlike idealized objects, fictional objects are
the kind of things to which real objects cannot meaningfully be said to approximate.7
Nonetheless, some universals which are about purely fictional entities appear to be of
some scientific use. Laws about epicycles and deferents in Ptolemaic astronomy (which
did have a measure of predictive power), or about virtual images in optics might be
examples of such laws.8 If there are genuine fictional laws, then, how are they confirmed?
Conversion to their (PAL) versions won’t do, since fictitious entities, as we described
them, cannot be (progressively) approximated by real objects.
It seems to me that confirmation or disconfirmation of a fictional law will have to
be in a different manner than the way idealizational generalizations are confirmed or
disconfirmed. Clearly, a fictional law will have to be tested through the observational im-
plications to be somehow elicited from it. But once a fictional law yields an observational
consequence of the form e→ f, our progressively-approximative approach could pick
up from there, and assert that the fictional law in question receives confirmation if better
approximation of experimental conditions to e brings actual observations closer to f.
There is a complication that needs to be mentioned in the confirmation and dis-
confirmation procedures for idealizational laws a` la the progressively-approximative
approach we described. In many cases when we are testing an idealizational law, we
employ a number of approximations and other idealizations than the one(s) that occurs
in the antecedent of the idealizational law. Take the testing of the law of ideal (or simple)
pendulum, for example, which states:
All ideal pendulums have a period of oscillation given by T = 2ð(l/g)1/2,
where l is the length of the suspension string. The assumptions that the pendulum
bob is a point mass and that the suspension string is weightless are part of what it
is to be an ideal pendulum, and hence are “internal” to the antecedent of the law.
When experimentally testing the law, we would typically employ a number of “external”
assumptions as well, such as that there is no air friction that would delay the swing; that
g, the gravitational acceleration parameter, remains constant during the swing; that the
ambient temperature does not affect the period; and so on. All these approximations
and idealizations would introduce errors that might conspire in such ways that our
efforts to bring real pendulums closer and closer to an ideal pendulum (by decreasing
the weight of their strings or making their bobs smaller and smaller) do not result
in their measured periods coming progressively closer to satisfy T = 2ð(l/g)1/2. In
other words, increased agreement between our experimental pendulums and the ideal
pendulum may not produce increasingly better agreement between our measurements of
the periods of them with the consequent of the law. If such nonmonotonous and erratic
behavior is only local and can convincingly be explained in terms of the conspiracy of
7Nancy Cartwright marks the distinction between idealizational and fictitious entities as follows:
There are the obvious idealizations of physics—infinite potentials, zero time correlations,
perfectly rigid rods, and frictionless planes. But it would be a mistake to think entirely in
terms of idealizations—of properties which we conceive as limiting cases, to which we can
approach closer and closer in reality. For some properties are not even approached in reality.
They are pure fictions. (Cartwright 1983, p. 153)
8Virtual images are surrogates for real objects whose role is basically to simplify the mathematics
involved (Laymon 1994, p. 36).
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the errors introduced by the internal and external idealizations and approximations
involved, the idealizational law would be regarded as confirmed. If the nonmonotonicty
and nonconvergence in the experimental fit cannot be attributed to local conspiracies of
errors, however, and can best be explained by the falsity of the idealizational law being
tested, then the law will be regarded as disconfirmed.9
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Deductive-nomological explanation (DN model)
General laws
Particular 
circumstances
Particular facts or 
less general law
Hempel, C. G., 1965,  Aspects of Scientific Explanation
Laws for Hempel:
regularity + additional criterion
Exceptionless generalizations
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Some criticisms against the DN model
Explanatory irrelevance:
(Salmon 1971, Kyburg 1965)
L: All males who take birth control pills regularly fail to get pregnant
C: John take birth control pills
---------------------------------------
E: John fails to get pregnant
→ DN model insuﬃcient
Lawless explanations:
Special sciences (economics, psychology, biology…) have no universal 
laws
→ DN model unnecessary
Ceteris paribus laws (cp-laws)
Not so many universal laws in (special) sciences…
…lots of restricted laws: 
“ceteris paribus, doing physical activities increases life span”
Semantically obscure:
no explicit description of the ceteris paribus clause (cp-clause)
→ Hard to know when to apply them or to make predic?ons
2 types of cp-clauses:
• Comparative: “other things being equal”
• Exclusive: “If no other relevant factor impinges”
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Dispositional view of cp-laws
Cp-Law as manifestation of capacities/disposition (Cartwright 1989):
• Capacities underlie causal claims
• Causal factor acting across all context
• Not always manifested: depends on other capacities
• Explains why laws also explanatory in non-ideal context
“What is thought to be an exception to a principle is always some 
other and distinct principle cutting into the former” (Mill, 1836)
Manifestation
Context
regularity
Categorical
basis
Set of 
properties
Event 
occurrence
2 degrees of generality/modality:
Causal law:
• supported by existence of a regularity
• relative to particular context
Capacity ascription:
• tendency associated with some properties/factor
• occurs in all context
Dispositional view of cp-laws
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Laws of nature and system laws
Schurz 2002 comes to a similar result for laws in physics:
Law of nature :
• unrestricted/universal law
• Total force law (2nd Newton’s principle), special force laws
• Not applicable per se (would require specification of all active forces)
System law:
• Refer to specific system,  need exclusive cp-clause
• Specification of all forces: boundary conditions
• Kepler law of planetary orbits, law of free fall etc.
• Often assume simplificatory assumptions 
• More contingent, but still law-like generalizations (support 
counterfactuals)
• Typical law of special sciences
→ System laws akin to theore?cal models
A two-layers based hypothetical reasoning
System laws/causal models: separable into two layers of laws
• Dispositional laws:
 Exclusive cp-laws
 Take real properties as argument
• Rules of composition
 Take dispositional laws as argument
Paradigmatic case: Newtonian forces
• Dispositional laws: special force laws
• Rule of composition: vector addition
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A two-layers based hypothetical reasoning
Dynamics of causal modeling:
• Choice of dispositions based on available properties (process under 
study and context) and explanatory goal
• Establishment of composition rule based on set of disposition
• Analysis of model’s consequences etc…
Sources of error:
• False disposition (supposing a false inference from a set of 
properties)
• Irrelevant disposition (related to irrelevant properties)
• Missing disposition
• False composition rule
A two-layers based hypothetical reasoning
Problem of ad hoc hypotheses:
1. recognizing genuine capacities
2. Iden?fying minimal set of capaci?es (proper inferen?al role  → 1.)
Some candidate criteria for genuine capacity:
• Preservation of explanatoriness over contextual change
• Production of new predictions
• Independent experimental manipulability
• Law resulting from agent based simulation
• Part of a minimal explanatorily exhaustive set of dispositions
• Theorems of second order logic? Non-monotonic logic?
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Back to DN model
Explanatory irrelevance:
(Salmon 1971, Kyburg 1965)
L: All males who take birth control pills regularly fail to get pregnant
C: John take birth control pills
---------------------------------------
E: John fails to get pregnant
→ DN model insuﬃcient
Lawless explanations:
Special sciences (economics, psychology, biology…) have no universal 
laws
→ DN model unnecessary
Back to DN model
Problem of lawfulness in special sciences:
What is special about physics then? Not that it does not offer knowledge about 
powers or capacities but rather that it has been able to establish other kinds of 
knowledge as well, knowledge that we can couple with our knowledge of capacities 
to make exact 
predictions.
This additional knowledge is primarily of two kinds: 1) We know for the powers of 
physics when they will be exercised (e.g., a massive object always attracts other 
masses); and 2) we have rules for how to calculate what happens when different 
capacities operate together (e.g., the vector addition law for forces). This kind of 
knowledge is missing for many other subjects. That is why they cannot make exact 
predictions. 
(Cartwright 2002, 6)
[…] non-physical sciences do not have laws of nature of their own, but they do have 
system laws of their own”
(Schurz 2002, 368)
72
Back to DN model
Explanation based on system laws
Problem of lack of lawfulness:
• Lawfull although more contingent/not exceptionless/idealizations
• Lawfulness supported by integration of universal laws/capacities
• Exclusive cp-laws might be defined theoretically (case in physics)
Problem of relevance:
System law should provide explanation only in situation displaying the 
relevant capacities and boundary conditions
Thanks for your attention!
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